





N A WORLD where the existence of large armed forces and the
threat of war appear almost as inescapable as death and taxes, de-
termination of the proper sphere for military authority has proved a
delicate and often controversial process. The requirements for accom-
plishing military objectives and for assuring an adequate national de-
fense must be balanced carefully against the danger of becoming a
garrison state and sacrificing important civil liberties. Some of the
difficulties of achieving a suitable reconciliation are illustrated by several
recent unsuccessful attempts to include certain categories of civilians
within American military jurisdiction.
A. Martial Law
In analyzing the amplitude of military jurisdiction over civilians,
a distinction should be drawn at the outset between martial law, the
law of war, and "military justice."' Military jurisdiction grounded on
martial law has long been sustained, so long as it was limited by the
necessity that provided the justification for martial law. Thus, a civilian
can be tried by a court-martial or military commission when, by reason
of invasion, insurrection, or the like, martial law has been invoked and
the civil courts cannot carry on their functions. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court ruled in the leading case of Ex parte Milligan,2 which
pertained to trial by military commission during the Civil War, that
civilians could not be subjected to a military trial if conditions did not
preclude the civil courts from opening their doors. This doctrine was
*A.B. x947, LL.B. 195o, Harvard University. Visiting Associate Professor of
Law, Duke University; Member of the North Carolina bar. Author, MILITARY JUS-
TICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES (1956). Contributor to legal
periodicals.
'For a general discussion, see EVERETIr MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 3 (1956). See also Underhill, Jurisdiction of Military
Tribunals in the United States over Civilians, 12 CALIF. L. REV. 75 (924).
271 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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strongly reaffirmed in Dnc v. Kahanamoka, which related to mili-
tary jurisdiction over civilians in Hawaii after the Pearl Harbor attack.
B. The Law of War
Trials of civilians by military tribunals have also been rested on the
law of war. For instance, the Supreme Court held in Ex parte Quirib4
that the law of war-a branch of international law-authorized the trial
by military commission of eight spies who disembarked in New Jersey
from a German submarine during the early stages of World War II.
Even the possible American citizenship of one spy and the availability
of American civil courts were not deemed to grant immunity from
military trial,5 since Congress had authorized such trial pursuant to its
constitutional power "to define and punish Piracies and Felonies com-
mitted on the high Seas, and offenses against the Law of Nations."6
With respect to the constitutional safeguards of grand jury and petty
juryT7 the Court reasoned that,8
The object was to preserve unimpaired trial by jury in all these cases in which
it had been recognized by the common law and in all cases of a like nature as
they might arise in the future .... but not to bring within the sweep of the
guaranty those cases in which it was then well understood that a jury trial
could not be demanded as of right.
Since offenses against the law of war, such as spying, had not been triable
by jury at common law, there was now no constitutional right to trial
by jury or to trial only in the civil courts.9
The law of war is considered to confer upon a victorious belligerent
327 U.S. 304 (1946). The two trials under consideration there had taken place
in August 1942 and in 1944, rather than immediately after Pearl Harbor. The Court's
opinion interpreted the Hawaiian Organic Act concerning martial law. See also
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
'317 U.S. 1 (1942).
* It deserves emphasis that the military trial was before an ad hoc tribunal with its
own special rules of procedure, and not a court-martial with procedure provided by
the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial. With a military commission
of this sort, the deprivation of safeguards for an accused is especially great. For an-
other case involving a specially-created military commission, see In re Yamashita, 327
U.S. 1 (1946).
0 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, d. so.
' Id. art. III, § 2 and the fifth and sixth amendments. These are discussed in Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 38-40 (1942).
8 Id. at 39.
'Id. at 40. The Supreme Court drew an analogy to the unavailability of trial by
jury for petty offenses, District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (937); for
criminal contempts, Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (x888) 5 and in an action for debt to
enforce a penalty inflicted by Congress, United States v. Zucker, 16x U.S. 475 (1896).
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the power to govern occupied territory by military courts. In Madsen
v. Kinsella,"° the Supreme Court held that a military government court
sitting in occupied Germany could even try an American wife who had
there slain her husband, an Air Force lieutenant. Speaking of military
commissions, the court commented: "Since our nation's earliest days,
such commissions have been constitutionally recognized agencies for
meeting many urgent governmental responsibilities related to war."'
Moreover, absent legislation by Congress to the contrary, the President,
as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, can prescribe the juris-
diction and procedure of such commissions.
C. "Military Justice"
Purported authorization for the exercise of military jurisdiction over
some civilians can also be found in the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice,12 which, as the Articles of War and the Articles for the Govern-
ment of the Navy previously did," provides for "military justice" and
sets forth certain "rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces."' 4 Among the provisions of the Uniform Code that
present problems of military jurisdiction over civilians are:1
10 343 U.S. 341 (1952). Cf. Neely v. Henkel, iSo U.S. 1o9 (19ox) (Cuba after
the Spanish-American War); United States ex rel. Mobley v. Handy, 176 F.2d 491
(sth Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 904 (1949) (occupied Germany); United States v.
Schultz, i U.S.C.M.A. 512, 4 C.M.R. 104 (1952) (Japan).
"Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346 (1952).
'The Uniform Code of Military Justice was originally enacted on May 5, 195o,
and was contained in 64 Stat. 1o8, 50 U.S.C. §§ 551-736 (1952). In 1956, it was
recodified, 7 oA Stat. 36-78, 1o U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1958).
" For some of the historical background of the Uniform Code, see EVERETr, op. cit.
supra note x, ch. 2.
"' See U.S. CoNsT. art. x, § 8, cl. 14. Undoubtedly the Uniform Code was primarily
intended by its draftsmen to provide "rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces." However, in drafting art. 18 of the Code, 7oA Stat. 43 (1956),
Io U.S.C. § 818 (1958), specific reference is made to the "law of war" as a basis for
military jurisdiction; and art. 104 and io6 of the Code, 7oA Stat. 70, 71 (1956), m0
U.S.C. §§ 904, 906 (1958), were probably drawn with the "law of war" in mind. See
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
" Problems of military jurisdiction over persons who were, in some sense, civilians
might also arise under art. z(i) of the Code, 7oA Stat. 37 (1956), 1o U.S.C. § 802(1)
(1958), which treats as subject to the Code, certain "persons lawfully called or ordered
into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed forces, from the dates when they are
required by the terms of the call or order to obey it," (analogous to the equitable
maxim about treating as done that which ought to be done); under art. 2(3) of the
Code, 7oA Stat. 37 (1956), 1o U.S.C. § 802(3) (1958), which covers "members of
a reserve component while they are on inactive duty training authorized by written
orders which are voluntarily accepted by them and which specify that they are subject
to" the Uniform Code (an interesting effort to create jurisdiction by consent) ; under
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(a) Article 2(io), which defines as subject to the Code "in time of
war all persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the
field.'
6
(b) Article 2(1i), which defines as subject to the Code
17
subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the United
States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, all
persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without
the continental limits of the United States and outside the following: that part
of Alaska east of longitude 172 degrees west, the Canal Zone, the main group
of the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
(c) Article 2(12), which defines as subject to the Code'8
subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the United States
is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, all persons
within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the
United States which is under the control of a Secretary of a Department and
which is without the continental limits of the United States ....
(d) Article 3(a), which provides that 9
subject to the provisions of Article 43, any person charged with having com-
mitted, while in a status in which he was subject to this code, an offense against
this code, punishable by confinement of five years or more and for which the
person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or any State or
Territory thereof or of the District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from
amenability to trial by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said
status.
art. z(4) (5) (6) of the Code, 7oA Stat. 37 (1956), 1o U.S.C. §§ 8oz(4) (S) (6)
(1958), which pertain to certain categories of retired and reserve personnel 5 and art.
z(7) of the Code, 7oA Stat. 37 (1956), io U.S.C. § 8o2(7) (1958), which covers
military prisoners. See generally EvEm,rr, op. cit. supra note i i AYCOCK & WuaFEL,
MILITARY LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE ch. 3 (1955). See
also In re Taylor, 16o F. Supp. 932 (W.D. Mo. 1958) i United States v. Bledsoe, i52
F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Wash. 1956), aff'd per cWriam, 245 F.zd 955 ( 9 th Cir. 957).
"8 In the recodification of the Uniform Code in i956, supra note 12, the word "all"
was deleted. See 7oA Stat. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 8oz(1o) (1958).
"In the recodification of 1956, the wording was modified to read: "Subject to any
treaty or agreement . . . or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving
with .... ." 7oA Stat. 37, io U.S.C. § 802(11) (1958).
" In the 1956 recodification, immaterial changes were made in wording. 7oA Stat.
38, 10 U.S.C. § 802(2) (1958). The changes parallel those made in art. 2(1) of
the Code. See note 17 supra.
"°Recodified with immaterial changes of phraseology in 7oA Stat. 38 (.956), io
U.S.C. § 803(a) (1958).
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(e) Article 4, which allows an officer dismissed by order of the
President, and who thereby becomes a civilian, to request trial by
general court-martial on the charges on which he was dismissed.2"
(f) Article i8, which provides that general courts-martial may "try
any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military
tribunal.)
21
(g) Article 48, which allows punishment of "any person" for con-
tempt by up to thirty days confinement and fine of $ioo or both.22
(h) Article to4, which allows punishment of "any person" who
aids the enemy in certain ways. 3
(i) Article io6, which allows punishment of "any person who in
time of war is found lurking as a spy or acting as a spy" under certain
circumstances.
D. Applicable Constitutional Provisions
The most apparent authorization for the enactment of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice lies in article one, section eight, clause fourteen
of the Constitution, wherein Congress is empowered "to make rules for
20 7oA Stat. 38 (1956), io U.S.C. § 804 (1958).
21 7oA Stat. 43 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § Sis (1958). There are three types of court-
martial-general, special, and summary. Only the general court-martial, which is
presided over by a law officer, whose role parallels that of a civilian judge, can impose
a sentence that entails more than six months of confinement or certain other punishments.
See EVERErr, op. cit. supra note i, ch. 9.
22 7oA Stat. 53 (956), 10 U.S.C. § 848 (1958). Probably sustainable by reason of
the special rules applicable for trial either of "petty offenses" or of contempts. Supra
note 9-
- 7oA Stat 70 (x956), so U.S.C. § 904 (1958). The only way to sustain this
provision would be to view it as an exercise of congressional power to "define and
punish ... offenses against the law of nations," U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. io, in accord
with the rationale of Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I (r942). Interestingly, art. 104 of the
Code contains no specific reference to "time of war"; but the term "enemy," as used in
that article, would probably be taken to connote wartime. Of course, as the Korean
hostilities made dear, there could be a serious question as to whether "war" requires a
formal declaration of war. Cf. Weissman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., x12 F. Supp.
420 (S.D. Cal. 1953)5 United States v. Shell, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 23 C.M.R. x1o
(1957); United States v. Taylor, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 232, 15 C.M.R 232 (1954); United
States v. Ayers, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 15 C.M.R. 2zo (1954); United States v. Gann,
3 U.S.C.M.A. 12, 11 C.M.R. 12 (1953); United States v. Bancroft, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3,
ii C.M.R. 3 (953); Langlas v. Iowa Life Ins. Co., 245 Iowa 713, 63 N.W.zd 885
(1954) Western Res. Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559, 261 S.W.zd 554, cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1954.). For an interesting contrast in approaches to the definition
of "war," compare Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. zz8 (1959), uith Ludecke v. Watkins,
335 U.S. x6o (1948). See also Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948); Underhill,
supra note i, at 84-88.
24 7oA Stat. 71 (1956), io U.S.C. § 9o6 (1958). See also the discussion at note Z3
supra.
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the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." 25  Even
without this mandate, however, it would seem quite supportable to sus-
tain the enactment 6f a code and the establishment of a system of military
justice under the legislative powers to "provide for the common de-
fense,726 "declare war,127 "raise and support armies,"2 and "provide and
maintain a navy"2 9 -especially in light of the broad authorization for Con-
gress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any depart-
ment or officer thereof."3 The last-quoted wording would sustain legis-
lation necessary and proper for the execution of the President's "execu-
tive power ' 13' and his authority as "commander in chief of the army
and navy.
M 2
Article three of the Constitution vests the "judicial power" in courts
whose judges shall have life tenure,3  extends this "power" to certain
"cases" and "controversies, ' 31 and requires that "the trial of all crimes,
except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be
held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but
when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place
or places as the Congress may by law have directed. 3 5  Clearly, this
last provision envisages that some crimes against the United States could
occur outside the boundaries of any American state, but how far this
extraterritoriality was intended to extend is not specified. There have,
however, been many cases involving crimes committed overseas.8 6
"' See Ex parte Reed, 1oo U.S. 13 (1879); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (2o How.)
65 (-857).
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. .. 27 d. cl. i.
28 Id. cl. 12. 'Id. cl. 13.
SId. cl. 18. Of course, the classic interpretation of the necessary and proper clause
was by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315
(1819).
"U.S. CONST. art. II, § Y. 32Id. § z.
"Id. art. III, § i
Id. § z. The "case and controversy" requirement for the exercise of judicial
power-and as a prerequisite for federal jurisdiction-has been considered in such cases
as Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1971), and Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227 (1937). At one time, it was considered that the real question in deter-
mining the validity of art. 3 (a) of the Code was whether "1case," as used in the fifth
amendment exception for "cases arising in the land or naval forces," had the same tech-
nical meaning as when used in art. III, § 2 of the Constitution.
" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, Cl. 2.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933)5 Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 4z1 (1932) ; United States v. Bowman, 26o U.S. 94 (1922) ; Jones v.
United States, 137 U.S. 202 (189o) ; United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531 (2d Cir.
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The fifth amendment of the Constitution states that "No person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces." Does "cases" here have the same technical
meaning that it has been construed to have when used in article three to
establish the "judicial power" over "cases" and "controversies"? 3 1 Prob-
ably not-especially since the word seems to have a meaning of its own
as used elsewhere in the fifth amendment in granting a privilege against
self-incrimination.8 Another interesting question is why the founding
fathers spoke of "land" and "naval forces" in the fifth amendment and
in article one, section eight, clause fourteen; but at some other places
used "army" and "navy." 9 Was there an underlying concept that some
persons might be members of the "land and naval forces," but not of
either the army or the navy?
The sixth amendment of the Constitution, which guarantees trial by
"an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed," contains no express exception like that in the fifth
amendment. However, the same exception for courts-martial found in
the fifth amendment has been read into this right of trial by jury."°
II
Toth v. Quarles
A. Background of Article 3(a)
As a prelude to examining Toth v. Quarles,4 which-at least partly"
-invalidated article 3(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, it
1954); Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939
(i95i)5 United States v. Chandler, 72 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass), aff'd, 171 F.2d 921
(st Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949). Of course, the prosecution must be based
upon some statute and it will apparently be presumed that the statute is not extraterri-
torial. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (19o9); United States
v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
' See note 34 supra.
' "[N]or shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
For leading cases relevant to the meaning of "case" in this context, see Ullman v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422 (x956) i Hale v. Henkel, zoi U.S. 43 (19o6); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
" See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12 & 13; art. II, § 2, all previously quoted in the
text in pertinent parts.
"'See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123, 138-39 (z866); Ex parle
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942).
41350 U.S. 1z (1955).
42 To the effect that art. 3 (a) of the Code is not completely dead and applies to one
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would be well to see how this provision became part of the Code in the
first place. To a considerable extent, it represented congressional re-
vulsion from the situation presented in Hirshberg v. Cooke,43 which
concerned an enlisted man who had been a Japanese prisoner of war,
and, after his liberation, was honorably discharged from the Navy on
March 26, 1946, because his original term of enlistment had expired.
He was reenlisted in the Navy the following day, and about one year
later, he was tried by court-martial on charges of maltreating other
American prisoners of war while in Japanese captivity. The Supreme
Court held-though not as a matter of constitutional interpretation-
that crimes committed in one enlistment cannot be carried over as a
basis for court-martial jurisdiction during a subsequent enlistmenti and
by this ruling, the defendant was virtually immunized from punishment
for his misdeeds. Congress was also aware of a similar situation which
concerned a WAC officer who, while on terminal leave, was apprehended
by military authorities who wished to court-martial her for participating
in the theft of the crown jewels of Hesse.44
Although these were the cases which particularly gave birth to
article 3(a) of the Code,4 5 there soon came to the public's attention
another instance that seemed to demonstrate the need for legislative
action. It was revealed in 1950-51 that two American OSS operatives,
while on a mission in Italy, had apparently murdered one of their com-
rades and disposed of his body in a deep lake. Neither of these men,
long out of the armed services, could be court-martialled under then-
existing law, nor did any American civil court have statutory authority
to try them. After extradition failed,43 both of the accused were com-
pletely secure against punishment anywhere for their alleged misdeed-
a result that would be prevented under the wording of article 3(a).
B. The Opinion of the Court
Robert Toth had been an airman serving in Korea. After his dis-
charge and return to civilian life, evidence was discovered which indi-
who committed a crime in a previous enlistment and then reenlisted in the armed services,
see United States v. Gallagher, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 5o6, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957).
'4336 U.S. 2zo (x949).
" Hironimus v. Durant, 168 F.2d z88 (4 th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 81S (1948)
(military jurisdiction upheld).
"See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 1i, z6 (1955)i United States v. Gallagher, 7
U.S.C.M.A. 5o6, 509, 22 C.M.R. 296, 299 (1957).
"'In re Lo Dolce, io6 F. Supp. 455 (W.D.N.Y. 1952). For the thwarting of
another effort to punish the alleged. killers, see United States v. Icardi, 14o F. Supp.
383 (D.D.C. 1956) (prosecution for perjury in connection with testimony given about
the slaying before a congressional committee).
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cated that he and two other men had collaborated in murdering a
Korean. The other two men, both still in the Air Force when the crime
was unearthed, were found guilty and sentenced by a court-martial to
confinement.47 Since no American civil court, whether state or federal,
had authority to punish a homicide in Korea, and since the punishment
for murder is greater than five years' confinement, Toth fell squarely
within the wording of article 3 (a) of the Code, which has been hereto-
fore quoted. The Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held, however, that this statute was invalid
as applied to one who had been separated from the Air Force and had
reverted to civilian life.
Although much of the discussion concerning the constitutionality of
article 3(a) of the Code had theretofore focused on the meaning of the
fifth amendment's exception to the grand jury requirement,48 the opinion
of the Supreme Court, written by Mr. Justice Black and joined in by
five other Justices, centers on the lack of power under the Constitution
to provide for any such trial of a person who has terminated all con-
nection with the armed forces. While conceding that the Court had
theretofore upheld military jurisdiction over a dishonorably discharged
soldier who was a military prisoner serving the sentence of a prior court-
martial, the majority comments that "given its natural meaning, the
power granted Congress 'to make rules' to regulate 'the land and naval
forces' would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to persons who
are actually members or part of the armed forces. 49  Of course, Mr.
Justice Black does not specify who is a "part" of the armed forces but
not a "member"5 and, not surprisingly, the Government in later cases
contended that this statement impliedly recognized an authority to
court-martial civilian dependents and employees as a "part" of the
armed forces. Be that as it may, the existence of this "natural meaning"
"'United States v. Schreiber, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 6oz, IS C.M.R. 226 (1955); United
States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742 (1954).
"" See, e.g., Morgan, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Non-Military Persons fnder
the Articles of War, 4 MINN. L. REv. 79 (1920) ; Underhill, Jupra note x, at 89-90;
Note, 67 HARV. L. REV. 479 (1954). Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia also centered on this point in their opinion in the Toth; case itself. Toth v.
Quarles, 215 F.zd 22 (1954). But cf., WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS
I05-07 (1920 Rep.).
,0 350 U.S. at iS. The leading case upholding military jurisdiction over a military
prisoner for offenses committed while in confinement but after discharge is Kahn v.
Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 (1920). Cf. Ex parte Mason, io5 U.S. 696 (88). It had
been thought that the validity of military jurisdiction over the discharged prisoner might
be tested in Lee v. M.adigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959); but the case was disposed of on
another ground.
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is rather surprising, since it does not seem to have been clearly glimpsed
by many of the persons most concerned with military jurisprudence."
Moreover, could it not be reasoned that the "rule" being promulgated
by Congress was, "Thou shalt not kill," that Toth had violated that
"rule" while a: serviceman, and that article one, section eight, clause
eighteen of the Constitution sustained article 3(a) of the Code as a
"necessary and proper" means for punishing violation of that norm in
the future? Under this hypothesis, the real issue would center not on
power, but on whether article three, section two of the Constitution,
and the fifth and sixth amendments limited the use of courts-martial in
this situation.
The majority supported its "plain meaning" interpretation of article
3(a) of the Code by noting that "any expansion of court-martial juris-
diction like that in the 195o Act necessarily encroaches on the jurisdic-
tion of article three of the Constitution where persons on trial are sur-
rounded with more constitutional safeguards than in military tri-
bunals."'" To be sure, as a prerequisite for the invocation of article 3 (a)
of the Code, there must be no state or federal court that can consider
the offense; and so it could be contended that necessarily there would
be no encroachment on civil jurisdiction. The majority's answer clearly
would be, however, that Congress could enact legislation to make the
crimes of ex-servicemen punishable in the federal courts ; and, therefore,
article 3(a) really encroaches on a jurisdiction with which the civil
courts could be entrusted.
Where, however, as in the Toth case itself, a crime committed over-
seas is involved, the expansion of federal civil court jurisdiction presents
some major problems.5" For instance, how and from whom will the
grand jury and petty jury be selected? Certainly it will be impossible
to fulfill the goal of the sixth amendment that the accused be tried "by
an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed." 53  In both federal civil courts and in courts-martial,
the prosecution and accused each has the benefit of the subpoena power,
54
50 See note 48 supra.
350 U.S. at x5 .
' See EVERETT, op. cit. supra note i, at 33-
Discussed by the majority in the Toth case. 350 U.S. at 16. Of course, as hereto-
fore noted, art. III, § z of the Constitution does contemplate that some cases will arise
overseas, but that the jury will be selected in the United States.
'See Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 46 & 47, 7 oA Stat. 53 (1956), 1o
U.S.C. §§ 846, 847 (1958). Concerning the availability of subpoenas for an accused
in a court-martial, see Everett, The Role of the Deposition in Military Justice, MILi-
TARY L. REV. 131, 136 (Dep't of Army Pamphlet 27-100-7, 196o).
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but this is of little avail if the witness to be subpoenaed resides in a
foreign land and the court is sitting in the United States. 5 It is ques-
tionable whether a federal district court has, or could permissibly be
given, any authority to hold sessions overseas, where the witnesses would
generally be more available and where local conditions could be observed
by the trier of fact. Even if permissible to do so, the transporting of
federal district judge and jury overseas does not seem feasible. On the
other hand, a court-martial can permissibly and readily be convened
anywhere in the world. 0
The Court emphasized the dangers lurking in military trials and
the advantages of a trial in federal civil courts-among them, the inde-
pendence provided by article three of the Constitution for federal judges,
who, unlike many state court jurists, enjoy life tenure, and the require-
ments of indictment by grand jury and trial by a petty jury chosen from
all walks of life. Under article 3 (a) of the Code, if upheld, millions
of veterans would remain indefinitely subject to the risk of trial by
court-martial and to the accompanying deprivation of important pro-
cedural safeguards. The risk would be heightened because, under the
Uniform Code, the prescribing of maximum limits on punishment is left
mostly to the President;5 7 therefore, the five-year-confinement limita-
tion on the applicability of article 3(a) would mean little if there were
a strong purpose to bring veterans within military jurisdiction. For
instance, a one day's absence without leave in a combat zone is some-
times punishable by life imprisonment, and yet is not triable in either
state or federal civil courts; therefore, under the Uniform Code an
ex-serviceman accused of this offense would always be subject to trial by
court-martial.
Despite a stated recognition of the importance of military discipline,
the majority concluded in the Toth case that the effort to court-martial
a civilian for offenses committed while on military duty is beyond Con-
gress' constitutional power, which is limited to "the least possible power
American citizens overseas can sometimes be compelled to testify. Blackmer v.
United States, z84 U.S. 421 (1932).
"The convening of the court-martial overseas is subject to the express or implied
consent of the foreign government where it proposes to hold its sessions. Frequently,
either by reason of a treaty or as a matter of comity, the foreign government will not
only consent to the holding of the courts-martial, but will also aid the court-martial to
obtain testimony. See SNEE & PYE, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT: CRIMINAL JURIS-
DICTION 94-101 (-957).




adequate to the end proposed."58 The circumstance that several other
countries, among them Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zea-
land, have enacted measures similar to article 3(a) of the Code was
deemed unimpressive, since those countries lack our Bill of Rights, "and
we are not willing to hold that power to circumvent those safeguards
should be inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause."59
Clearly the test of the "least possible power adequate to the end
proposed" differs in emphasis from Chief Justice Marshall's time-
honored pronouncement in McCulloch v. Maryland concerning the
necessary and proper clause that "where the law is not prohibited, and
is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the govern-
ment, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would
be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to
tread on legislative ground."6" Even where there is applied only the
test stated by the Court, however, some doubt remains as to the correct
outcome. Presumably the "end proposed" by article 3(a), as well as the
other articles of the Uniform Code, is the maintenance of discipline in
the armed services and, as a corollary, the punishment of infractions of
discipline. Such a goal is certainly legitimate. Also, it is clear that in
disorganized combat areas, and even elsewhere, an offense may not come
to light for several years-as was true in the instance of the OSS slaying
in northern Italy. The prospect that an offense, if committed, may not
soon be discovered is certainly one incentive to commit the crime. This
incentive is enhanced when it becomes apparent that in the event dis-
covery is retarded, prosecution will be difficult, if not impossible. Con-
sequently, the significant question would seem to be whether the Su-
preme Court did suggest a feasible alternative when it proposed that
trial of ex-servicemen be committed to the federal district courts, rather
than to courts-martial. Of course, the practical difficulties, hereinbefore
discussed, that may accompany the civil court trial of a veteran like
Toth, whose suspected offense occurred overseas, bear heavily on such
feasibility. Moreover, in light of the antimilitaristic tradition of some
ra 350 U.S. at 23. The Court cited Anderson v. Dunn, i9 U.S. (6 Wheat. 2o4) 230,
231 (i8i).
Go 350 U.S. at 22. For the foreign laws concerned, see the dissent of Justice Reed,
id. at 30.
Go 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 3 16, 423 (18 x 9). Another well-known constitutional formula
is in these terms: CLet the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
Id. at 42 x.
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of the foreign countries whose military law parallels article 3(a) of the
Code,' it seems highly relevant to feasibility that these countries felt
compelled to restrict trial by jury by providing for the court-martial
of ex-servicemen.
In a footnote to its opinion, the Court commented that the fifth
amendment "does not grant court-martial power to Congress; it merely
makes dear that there need be no indictment for such military offenses
as Congress can authorize military tribunals to try under its Article I
power to make rules to govern the armed forces."'62 It is indisputable
that the Bill of Rights, which purports to limit governmental authority,
cannot be used directly as a source of congressional power. However,
the Supreme Court has noted that "the first ten amendments and the
original Constitution were substantially contemporaneous and should be
construed in pari materia."63  Under this approach, the wording of the
fifth amendment exception to the grand jury safeguard would seem to be
a valid aid to the construction of the power "to make rules" for the
"land and naval forces," so that congressional power under article one,
section eight, clause fourteen of the Constitution would then be co-
extensive with "cases arising in the land or naval forces." In that event,
it would be necessary to determine the meaning of the last-quoted
wording.
In this same connection it should be recalled that one announced
reason for a narrow construction of military jurisdiction here was to
avoid circumvention of the Bill of Rights. If the wording of the ex-
ception in the fifth amendment for "cases arising in the land or naval
forces" should itself properly be interpreted as excluding from the grand
jury safeguard "4 a crime committed by a serviceman, regardless of his
later status, it could be argued that there was little reason to adopt a
narrow construction of congressional power in order to impose judicially
a limitation that the founding fathers had declined to impose when they
drafted the fifth amendment.
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Reed, joined by Justices Minton and Burton, dissented force-
fully. In support of his contention that Congress possessed a long-
"3 The English tradition in this regard was adverted to in Caldwell v. Parker, z5z
U.S. 376, 3 82 (19z0).
62 350 U.S. at 14 n.5.
"3 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, z98 (930).




recognized power to enact legislation like article 3(a) of the Code, he
cited precedents upholding as constitutional a statute originally enacted
in 1863 and purporting to reserve military jurisdiction over ex-service-
men in certain fraud cases. 5 In so far as the fifth amendment exception
for "cases arising in the land or naval forces" is concerned, Justice Reed
considered that the word "case" did not refer to litigation, here the
commencement of prosecution (which, of course, occurred after Toth
had become a civilian), but instead it signified a series of events that
constituted an offense (and the facts that constituted the alleged mur-
der had all existed prior to Toth's discharge so that he would have been
subject to court-martial if these facts had then been known to military
authorities) ."
Justice Reed noted that even though Toth had become a civilian,
6
1
there was no doubt that he was a serviceman at the time of the alleged
crime. Therefore, no problem was presented of bringing new civilians
within the field of military authority in so far as the promulgation of
rules of conduct was concerned. The only issue concerned the procedure
for punishing violations of those rules. As a precedent for military
jurisdiction over this civilian, the dissent cited the precedents allowing
court-martial of a draftee who has not reported for induction as ordered,
and who is, therefore, in one sense still a civilian.68
or 350 U.S. at 3z-34. The statute, carried forward later into the Articles of War
and the Articles for the Government of the Navy, was iz Stat. 696 (x863). Among
the decisions upholding this statute are Kronberg v. Hale, iSo F.zd iz8 ( 9 th Cir.),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 969 (195o) 5 Ex parte Joly, 290 Fed. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 19z2)5
Terry v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash. 1933) 5 In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas.
796 (No. 1,596) (C.C. Cal. 1873).
Go 350 U.S. at 39. Justice Reed drew an analogy to United States v. Bevans, Y6
U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 388 (1S8S) ("the waters on which . . . cases may arise");
Waring v. Clarke, U.S. (5 How.) 44.1, 466-67 (1847) ("cause of action arisen on
the ocean"). The opposing position would gain strong support from art. III, § 2,
vhich refers to "all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution ....
See note 34 supra.
7 However, note that Justices Burton and Minton, in a separate dissenting opinion,
take the position that Toth had only a "conditional discharge" and was not "a full-
fledged civilian." 350 U.S. at 44.
0 0 ld. at 32. See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1917). With respect to
World War II inductees, it was held that military jurisdiction did not attach until
actual induction had taken place as provided for by Selective Service Regulations.
Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542 (1944). However, the result was not in any way
rested on constitutional grounds3 and apparently the court still considered that it would
be constitutional to treat as subject to military jurisdiction persons who had been ordered
to report for induction and be inducted, but who had for some reason failed to do so.
Id. at 556.
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D. Some General Observations
Most of the objections to civil court trial of ex-servicemen like Toth
center on the situation where the crime occurs abroad. Accordingly, as
a matter of legislative draftsmanship, it might have been wise if, at the
time the Uniform Code was first adopted, jurisdiction under article 3 (a)
had been limited (a) to persons still in the armed forces under a re-
enlistment,6" and (b) to persons who are now civilians but who com-
mitted major crimes while they were in the armed forces and outside
the United States and its territories.
In such instances, even while acknowledging the importance of the
tradition of trial by a local jury, one can properly emphasize that any
such trial is an impossibility and that necessarily, if tried in a civil court,
the case will be determined by persons who are not from the area where
the crime took place and who may, therefore, be unaware of important
circumstances. Moreover, where the crime occurred overseas, there
might be considerable expense and difficulty in getting witnesses, espe-
cially foreign witnesses, to come to the United States to testify in a
federal district court; and disruption in military operations might be
produced by bringing military witnesses back from overseas to testify.
In such situations of undiscovered crime overseas, the only real
alternatives often will be extradition to the foreign country for trial, or
simply no punishment at all. Extradition will, of course, hinge on the
wording of the extradition treaty and the desire of the foreign govern-
ment to prosecute. When it is obtained, the ironic result will be that the
accused is subjected to foreign trial-often lacking in many of the safe-
guards that are provided for courts-martial by the Uniform Code of
Military Justice-because of a doctrinaire insistence on protecting him
from a remote military despotism. Should extradition fail and trial in
a federal civil court prove impossible, the result will occasionally be not
only a windfall for the ex-serviceman, but also a discrimination against
fellow criminals whose crimes were discovered prior to their discharge.70
6" This was the situation involved in United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336
U.S. z1o (i949), and in United States v. Gallagher, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 5o6, 22 C.M.R.
296 (1957). See also United States v. Estrada, is C.M.R. 872 (1955); United States
v. Owens, 6 C.M.R. 691 (1952).
"0 This was the case with Toth, his two comrades, who were still in the Air Force,
having been tried by court-martial. Of course, in many instances, the man in uniform
occupies an especially precarious position. For example, if a serviceman steals property
within the United States, he can be prosecuted by a state court for the offense as well
as by a court-martial. There is no double jeopardy, because the tribunals draw their
authority from different sources. See EvERErr, op. cit. supra note i, at 38-40. A civilian
committing the same crime in the same place and in collaboration with the serviceman
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With respect to dangers of trial by court-martial, it would seem that
the majority exaggerated them considerably as a forensic device to up-
hold the decision. Certainly, the reader of the Court's opinion would
hardly recognize military justice as the same system referred to in some
other recent Supreme Court opinions.7 Might not the best solution have
been to uphold military jurisdiction over Toth, but to apply a broader
standard of review to all trials by court-martial-whether of ex-service-
men like Toth or persons still in uniform? 71 Moreover, the risks under
article 3 (a) of the Code seem to pale into insignificance alongside those
created by the Quirin case, which allows American citizens to be tried
before ad hoc military commissions-subject neither to the requirements
of the Bill of Rights nor to those of the Uniform Code of Military
could only be punished in a state court, since he would not be subject to military justice
and no crime cognizable by a federal district court has been committed. The same
double exposure of a serviceman to punishment will exist in some foreign countries where
he may be stationed. Id. at 46.
"' See, e.g., the comment of the original majority in Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S.
470, 474 (1956), that, "The Code was carefully drawn by Congress to include the
fundamental guarantees of due process, and in operation it has provided a fair and
enlightened system of Justice,"; and of Judge Latimer in United States v. Burney, 6
U.S.C.M.A. 776, 796, zi C.M.R. 98, xr8 (1956). How fair then is military justice
today? Among its disadvantages are the possibilities that a commanding officer may
control or influence the deliberations of the court-martial; the failure to insure the
competency and independence of the "trial judge" (although immense strides forward
are being made in this regard) ; the vagueness in some provisions of substantive military
law, see Everett, Article 134 , Uniform Code of Military Justice--4 Study in Vagueness,
37 N.C.L. Ray. 14z (x959) 5 the occasional bypassing of courtroom safeguards by use
of administrative procedures5 the relative lack of safeguards for the summary or special
court-martial; the limited scope of the right of confrontation, see Everett, The Role of
the Deposition in Military Justice, MILITARY L. Rav. 13' (Dep't of Army Pamphlet
No. 27-100-7, x96o) ; occasionally harsh substantive rules and sentences; and occasionally
less than proficient trial and defense counsel (a situation that has also vastly improved
in recent years). It must always be remembered, however, that there is another side
to the ledger. The advantages granted an accused under today's system of military jus-
tice include: warning against self-incrimination before any interrogation is commenced;
free counsel for the accused during the formal pretrial investigation required for serious
offenses and during the trial itself; liberal rules as to mental responsibility and as to
some substantive matters; liberal rules for the review of courts-martial; a free copy of
the record of trial; no costs to the accused for appeal of a case; free appellate defense
counsel; review of the appropriateness of the sentence as well as of the facts and law.
Compare Walsh, Return to Drumhead Justice? 42 A.B.A.J. 521 (1957), 'withs Hamil-
ton, Drumhead Justice is Dead!, 43 A.B.A.J. 797 (957).
"' Concerning the present standard for review of courts-martial by civil courts, see
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953). But cf., Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S.
122 (195o). See also Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569 (1957). At the present time,
courts-martial are more insulated than state courts from review by federal civil courts.
See EVERET, op. cit. supra note 1, at 313.
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Justice-for alleged violations of the amorphous, largely nonstatutory
law of war.
II]
AMERICAN CIVILIANS ABROAD--THE 1956 VERSION
A. Factual Background
In June 1956, the Supreme Court handed down the short-lived
opinions in Kinsella v. Krueger73 and Reid v. Covert,7 4 which concerned
the status of two ladies who, while overseas and in alien territory-
one in Japan and the other in Great Britain,-had slain their respective
spouses, who were then members of the armed services. The Covert
case involved the added problem that the accused's conviction had been
reversed by the Court of Military Appeals because of error in the treat-
ment of her sanity defense,75 and a rehearing had been ordered, which
was scheduled to take place in the United States at Bolling Air Force
Base, rather than overseas. Although each accused had been tried for
and convicted of premeditated murder, each had received only a life
sentence for the crime.76 Writs of habeas corpus had been sought to
obtain the release of each defendant.77
B. The Government's Position
I. Power under article one, section eight, clause fourteen
The Government counsel fired two barrels in defense of military
jurisdiction-one loaded with ammunition provided by article one,
section eight, clause fourteen, which authorizes Congress "to make rules"
for the "land and naval forces," and the other with that obtained from
an assumed authority to regulate foreign affairs. As to the former, it
was urged that civilian dependents came within the purview of the
"land and naval forces," and that article 2(11) of the Uniform Code
represented merely the exercise of congressional power specifically
entrusted by the Constitution.
This interpretation was substantiated by several previous Supreme
' 351 U.s. 470 (956).
7 351 U.s. 487 (.956).
' United States v. Covert, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 19 C.M.R. 174 0955).
7' At the rehearing, under the Uniform Code, the court-martial could not have im-
posed a sentence more severe than at the original trial. See Uniform Code of Military
Justice § 6 3 (b), 7oA Stat. 58 (1956), io U.S.C. § 863(b) (958).
17See United States v. Kinsella, 137 F. Supp. 8o6 (S.D.W. Va. 1956) ; Reid v.
Covert 351 U.S. 487, 488 (1956).
[Vol. i96o: 366
Vol. x96o: 366] MILITARY JURISDICTION 383
Court pronouncements. For instance, as early as the landmark case of
Ex parte Milligan, it had been commented :78
The discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy, required
other and swifter modes of trial than are furnishcd by the common law
courts; and, in pursuance of the power conferred by the Constitution, Con-
gress has declared the kinds of trial and the manner in which they shall be
conducted, for offences committed while the party is in the military or naval
service. Every one connected with these branches of the public service is
amenable to the jurisdiction which Congress has created for their government,
and, while thus serving, surrenders his right to be tried by the civil courts.
In Duncan v. Kahanamoku, the opinion of the Court, written by
Justice Black, spoke of a "well-established power of the military to
exercise jurisdiction over members of the armed forces [and] those
directly connected with such forces . . . ."7 Especially in point was
Madsen v. Kinsella,8" which some commentators had deemed to have
settled that jurisdiction exists to court-martial any civilian dependents
overseas. 8 ' In fact, Mrs. Madsen claimed that a military government
court lacked jurisdiction to try her because she fell within the jurisdic-
tion of a court-martial. A close reading of the opinion there seems
dearly to indicate that the Court accepted her contention that she was
subject to court-martial, but reasoned that this jurisdiction was con-
current with, not exclusive of, the jurisdiction of military government
courts established by American military authorities to dispense justice
in occupied Germany. 2 The remark by the Court in the Toth case
concerning persons "who are actually members or part of the armed
forces" was also seized upon by the Government to support its inter-
pretation. 3
Various lower court precedents were cited that upheld military
jurisdiction over various civilians who were "in the field" with the
armed forces84 and thus could be viewed as sustaining an hypothesis
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866). (Emphasis added.)
327 U.S. 304, 33 (1946). (Emphasis added.)
so 343 U.S. 341 (95z).
81 AYCOCK & WURFEL, op. cit. s pra note 15, at 6o-61.
" See the discussion of the Madsen case in United States v. Burney, 6 U.S.C.M.A.
776, 793, 21 C.M.R. 9 8, 115 (.956).
83 350 U.S. at 15. (Emphasis added.) Also tending to uphold jurisdiction were
the rulings of the Supreme Court that discharged military prisoners could be court-
martialed, as well as persons who had been ordered to report for induction but had
failed to do so. Supra notes 49, 68.
8' See, e.g., Hines v. Mikell, z59 Fed. 28 (4 th Cir. 1919) 3 Ex parte Jochen, 257
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that some civilians fall within the purview of the "qand and naval
forces." For the most part, these cases concerned employees, rather
than dependents, but government counsel did call attention to historical
materials indicating that in both the British and American armies
around the time of the American Revolution, some women accompany-
ing the armed forces had been court-martialed. 5
Unlike Toth, the two civilian dependents did have a close connec-
tion with the armed forces both at the time of the offense and at the
time of trial. They were transported overseas at government expense;
they went overseas with special passports that reflected their status as
dependents of military personnel; they received special commissary,
post exchange, housing, postal, and currency privileges; and so on. In
the minds of the populaces in the countries to which these two spouses
had accompanied their husbands, they were closely identified with the
American armed forces.
Furthermore, according to the Government, the necessities of the
situation should help sustain an interpretation of article one, section
eight, clause fourteen of the Constitution that would include in the
"land and naval forces" civilian dependents who accompanied their
husbands overseas. In countries like Germany-a land where, accord-
ing to the Government, there were recently well over i5o,ooo Ameri-
can military dependents-the problems of maintaining discipline would
be exacerbated if court-martial jurisdiction were lacking. A civilian
can do equally as much harm as someone in uniform if, while overseas,
he kills, peddles narcotics, smuggles, spies, or neglects security regula-
Fed. zoo (S.D. Tex. i919); Ex parte Falls, 251 Fed. 415 (D.N.J. 1918); Ex parte
Gerlach, 247 Fed. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). These decisions were cited by the Supreme
Court with apparent approval in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 313 n.7
(1946). And Ex parte Jochen, supra, at 204, states specifically: "That it is not neces-
sary that a person be in uniform in order to be a part of the land forces, I think clear,
not only upon considerations of common sense and common judgment, but upon well-
considered and adjudicated authority."
" No effort will be made here to summarize the voluminous historical material that
was presented to the Court by the briefs on both sides. The Government relied heavily
on some of the instances during the American Revolution of court-martial of women
accompanying the armed forces, as recited in BLUMENTHAL, WOMAN CAMP FOLLOWERS
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1952). The relation of women to the armed forces
at that time is felicitously described by Blumenthal in these terms: "British camp women
in the Revolution were an established institution. It was the tradition that men-at-arms
needed women-at-arms. Nor did the Revolution end the British tradition." Id. at 53.
It might be suggested that, for American forces stationed overseas today, the importance
to their morale of having the companionship of their families is as great as was the
importance of the "camp women" to the morale of the British troops in the Revolution.
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tions. Such harm can be direct, or it can be indirect-for example,
through the creation of an international incident.
86
2. Powers outside the United States
In Missouri v. Holland,7 the Supreme Court, in ruling on a statute
that had been passed to execute a treaty with England and that was
being assailed as an interference with the rights reserved to the states by
the tenth amendment, commented that "Acts of Congress are the
supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitu-
tion, while Treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority
of the United States." This statement has aroused considerable appre-
hension in some persons because of its interpretation by them as meaning
that, subject perhaps to specific limitations like those of the Bill of
Rights,88 Congress can enact any laws so long as they can be brought
under the umbrella of some treaty.
If article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice could be
linked to the execution of some treaty, government counsel hoped that
it could be sustained, even if it were deemed by the Supreme Court to
fall outside the congressional powers granted by article one, section
eight, clause fourteen of the Constitution. Furthermore, there are
some indications that an administrative agreement or other international
compact not falling within the precise definition of a "treaty" would
suffice to provide legislative power.89
Today, a multilateral treaty, the NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment, does govern the relationship of American military jurisdiction to
the authority of several of the "receiving states" wherein our forces are
located °0  At the time of the two uxoricides with which the Supreme
Court was concerned, however, the relationship was controlled by
administrative agreements of the United States with Great Britain and
with Japan. 1 The circumstance that article 2(11) of the Code pre-
ceded the agreement with Japan made it difficult to view the agreement
so An exceptionally good discussion of this whole problem is contained in the
opinion of Judge Latimer in United States v. Burney, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 776, zi C.M.R.
98 (1956), a copy of which opinion was filed as an appendix to one of the Government
briefs.
7 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
8 Cf. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
"' Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) Un'ited States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937).
0 TIAS 2846. For a comprehensive discussion of this treaty, see SNEE & PYE, op.
cit. supra note 56. See also Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. io43 0957).
"1 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. i, 15-16 (-957).
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as authorizing that provision of the Uniform Code. Moreover, the
initial wording of article 2(I1 )--"subject to the provisions of any treaty
or agreement"-is not calculated to convince one that the treaty-making
power can sustain this military jurisdiction. Most important, there has
been no showing that either in drafting article 2(11) of the Code or in
negotiating any international arrangement, anyone intended to use the
power to make treaties and international agreements as a springboard
for creating military jurisdiction of American military civilians over-
seas.
92
Another, and rather shadowy, area of authority exists as to inter-
national affairs, however, from which government counsel also sought
to derive support. In United States v. Crtiss-Wright0 3 the Supreme
Court was called upon to consider authority delegated to the President
by Congress to halt certain shipments of arms overseas. The Court first
noted that the defendant's objection of unlawful delegation might have
more weight if the delegation related to internal, rather than external
and foreign, affairs. Then, it was emphasized that with respect to in-
ternal affairs, the federal government can exercise no powers except
those specifically enumerated in the Constitution or those implied there-
from as necessary and proper. The primary purpose of the Constitution
was to carve from the general mass of legislative powers then possessed
by the states those that it was thought desirable to vest in the federal
government, and the rest, those not enumerated in the Constitution,
were left with the states. This carving out applied only to powers that
the states then had; not, however, to powers that already were in the
federal government because of a transfer of external sovereignty from
the Crown.
The upshot of this reasoning was the Court's conclusion that certain
powers, such as those to declare war, conclude peace, make treaties, and
maintain diplomatic relations, would repose in the United States as an
attribute of its national sovereignty--even if those powers were never
mentioned in the Constitution. The Court gave various examples of
powers possessed by the United States simply because it is a member
of the family of nations, and without which it would not be completely
2Cf. SNEE & PYE, op. cit. supra note 56, at 7-40. Actually, the American nego-
tiators undoubtedly assumed that they already possessed this jurisdiction under the Uni-
form Code, and, therefore, they had no occasion to consider the use of a treaty to create
this jurisdiction. Instead, they were seeking to induce the "receiving states" to consent
of the exercise of American jfirisdiction and to waive their own territorial jurisdiction
over the Americans stationed within their boundaries.
93 99 U.S. 304 (936).
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sovereign. In so far as the role of the President was concerned, the
Supreme Court concluded that his special responsibilities in the field of
foreign affairs justify an extra leeway for Congress to delegate authority
to him. 4
Government counsel considered that the Curtiss-Wright case was
ample precedent for the Court to hold now that military jurisdiction
over American dependents accompanying the armed forces overseas did
not have to be linked to any specific constitutional power. Instead, it
could be rested on some concept of "'sovereignty" and on the premise
that an entirely different technique for ascertaining congressional and
presidential power should be utilized where external affairs are involved.
Incidentally, since Toth's alleged offense concerned what might be con-
sidered American "external affairs"-the killing of a Korean by an
American airman while he was in Korea-the same reasoning might
even have been advanced in support of military jurisdiction over him.
C. The Opinion of the Court
The original opinion of the Court, delivered in 1956, was written
by Justice Clark and concurred in by Justices Reed, Minton, Burton,
and Harlan. The majority found it unnecessary to consider whether
article 2(11) of the Code could be sustained under article one, section
eight, clause fourteen of the Constitution. Instead, they noted that it
had been long recognized that Congress "may establish legislative courts
outside the territorial limits of the United States proper."95 Moreover,
in cases arising in Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, the Court
had affirmed the power of Congress to provide a system of justice that
did not include trial by jury. 6  Great reliance was also placed on the
rather old case of In re Ross,97 which upheld the jurisdiction of an
American consular court in Yokohoma to convict an American seaman
of an offense committed in Japan. Although the United States has
now relinquished all of its extraterritorial rights in any foreign country,
the Court considered that the jurisdiction of the consular courts fur-
Cf. Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
"'Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 475 (.956).
"Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (19z2); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197
(1903) i and Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (i9o4). As to these legislative courts,
see also the leading case of American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, z6 U.S. (i Pet.)
511 (1828).
17 40 U.S. 453 (189i). The consular court whose jurisdiction was challenged in
this case had been established pursuant to a treaty between the United States and Japan.




nished an apt analogy for court-martial jurisdiction of civilian dependents
overseas. The Ross case, together with the cases involving jurisdiction
over American territories, was held to "establish beyond question that
the Constitution does not require trial before an Article III court in a
foreign country for offenses committed there by an American citizen
and that Congress may establish legislative courts for this purpose.""'
In so far as the cases concerning trials in Hawaii, the Philippines and
Puerto Rico are concerned, it can be seen that they are readily distin-
guishable since, under article four, section three of the Constitution,
Congress does have express "power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belong-
ing to the United States." Thus, as to persons in those geographic areas,
Congress did have some authority to proceed merely because of the
relationship of those areas to the United States. For example, no one
could question the power of Congress to enact a substantive criminal
code for those areas, even if-by reason of article three of the Constitu-
tion and the Bill of Rights-some question might be raised concerning
the type of procedure that could be created to enforce that substantive
code.
On the other hand, if civilian dependents overseas are not within
the "land and naval forces" under article one, section eight, clause four-
teen of the Constitution, a question can properly be raised about the
power of Congress even to enact a substantive code of conduct for these
individuals. In general, federal criminal jurisdiction has been exer-
cised territorially, although there have been various prosecutions for
offenses committed overseas and some dicta claiming American authority
to punish American citizens for crimes committed anywhere in the
world.9  Nonetheless, if an effort were made to prosecute an American
"Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 476 (1956).
"See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (194i), stating that "... the
United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the con-
duct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights
of other nations or their nationals are not infringed." This same statemement is quoted
in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 587 (1953). In light of their context and the
precedents cited in their support, it is quite possible that the Court had in mind a situation
like that in Bowman v. United States, 26o U.S. 94 (1922), where a rather direct effect
on governmental operations was present. For further consideration of extraterritoriality,
see BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 23x-36 (sth ed. 1955); BREWSTER, ANTITRUST
AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1958). In the last-cited text, reliance is placed on
the Ross case as supporting extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, in light of the ill
fate of the Ross case in recent times, as described hereinafter in greater detail, this re-
liance may be misplaced. In Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957), the Supreme
Court was called upon to consider an administrative agreement between the United
[Vol. i96o: 366
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tourist in a federal district court for a homicide allegedly committed in
England or Japan-and assuming a federal statute specifically authorized
such prosecution-there would certainly be a permissible question as to
the constitutional basis for such a trial. Would it rest on the "attribute-
of-sovereignty" approach taken in the Curtiss-Wright case? Or on
what? If the federal government is a government of express powers
and there is no express power to deal with foreign homicides by Ameri-
can citizens, does it not follow that such homicides should be deemed
beyond the powers of our government to punish? To go one step
further, if civilian dependents overseas are not part of the "land and
naval forces" within the meaning of article one, section eight, clause
fourteen of the Constitution, as properly interpreted, should they not
be treated for purposes of the present analysis exactly like tourists
overseas?
In the Ross case, the offender had not committed his crime in an
American territory-although apparently on an American ship-and so
the right to try him could not be grounded on article four, section three
States and Japan wherein provision was made concerning criminal jurisdiction over
American military personnel in Japan. Girard, an American soldier, had shot and killed
a Japanese national. In discussing this homicide, the Court remarked: CA sovereign
nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within
its borders unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction." Id.
at 529. This statement is subject to several interpretations. If it be taken to mean that
a nation can punish only crimes "against its laws," the court has done little more than
state a truism; even when the laws of another sovereignty are made the basis of punish-
ment--as in the United States may occur under the Assimilative Crimes Act, 6z Stat.
686 (1948), IS U.S.C. § 13 (1958) i see United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286
(x 9 5 )-the rationale seems to be that those other laws are being adopted into the law
of the government whose courts are trying the accused. However, the Court's remark-
especially when applied to Girard's offense of homicide-may have a more profound
import. If the jurisdiction of the sovereign nation is truly "exclusive," absent consent,
then it would seem to mean that at the outset the United States would lack any juris-
diction over any of its personnel who were in the foreign country. In other words, if
the statement is taken literally, the United States had no jurisdiction to try Girard for
killing a Japanese citizen. In that event, incidentally, could any American civilian
court have been given jurisdiction to try Toth for his killing of a Korean in Korea, if
the Korean government declined its "consent" for such a trial? Moreover, if the
Supreme Court in the Girard case really meant that there was "exclusive" jurisdiction,
absent the consent to trial on the part of the "receiving state," is it not true that the
(consent" of the foreign government has really created jurisdiction in American courts-
martial? At least, there will be jurisdiction where there was none before. But, to
conceive of a foreign government as being able to create American military jurisdiction
would clash violently with some of the views expressed in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957). Still other interpretations are possible of the Court's comment in the Girard
case, such as that "exclusive" means only "primary."
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of the Constitution. Whence, then, came the power to prosecute him in
any sort of American court, whether it were a federal district court sitting
with judge and jury in the United States or some type of legislative
court? Was the power in the Ross case the product of the treaty be-
tween the United States and Japan? Was it a manifestation of Ameri-
can sovereignty, in accord with the principles enunciated in the Curtiss-
Wright case? Or was the result in the Ross case merely a reflection of
unsophisticated analysis of the problem?
Certainly in light of the Toth holding, which rested on lack of
power to utilize military jurisdiction, it would have been highly appro-
priate in Kinsella v. Krueger for the majority to have explained more
fully how the cases it had cited established the existence of a power
either to provide substantive rules of conduct for American dependents
accompanying the armed forces overseas or to authorize trial by court-
martial to punish violations of those substantive rules. The absence of
such explanation left the majority vulnerable to a jibe by Justice Frank-
furter that in relying on the Ross case, it had resurrected "an episode
of the dead past about as unrelated to the world of today as the one-
horse shay is to the latest airplane." 0
D. The Petition for Rehearing
During the months after the opinions were filed upholding jurisdic-
tion over the two civilian dependents, a petition for rehearing was filed
and granted, Justice Harlan, one of the five justices in the earlier ma-
jority, having now determined that further consideration of the result
was called for. The Supreme Court specifically invited the discussion
of four issues °:101 (i) "specific practical necessities" for, and "practical
alternatives" to, court-martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents over-
seas; (2) relevant historical evidence, especially as to whether "the Art.
1, § 8, c. 14, power was thought to have a fixed and rigid content or
rather that this power, as modified by the Necessary and Proper Clause,
was considered -a broad grant susceptible of expansion under changing
circumstances"; (3) the relevance overseas and in time of peace of any
distinction between civilian employees and dependents; and (4) the
relevance for "court-martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents over-
seas in time of peace, of any distinctions between major crimes and petty
offenses."
'0 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 482 (959) (reservation of Justice Frank-
furter).
'01 Reid v. Covert, 35z U.S. 901 (1956).
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The practical necessities, which are the subject of the Court's first
issue, had already been adverted to in its original opinion in Kinsella v.
Krueger.10 2  They exist chiefly because of the difficulties, expenses, and
delay involved in trying before an American civilian court in this coun-
try an offense which occurred overseas. The suggestion has also been
made that some type of special American courts might be established to
try such crimes abroad.'0 3  Even with such courts, however, no method
for assuring trial by jury seems feasible. Moreover, such courts could
not be convened in a foreign country without the consent of the govern-
ment involved; and any such tribunals would be so reminiscent of occu-
pation courts or the now-discredited rights of extraterritoriality, that
such consent might not be forthcoming. Indeed, if American courts do
not consider that civilian dependents accompanying the armed forces
overseas are so closely connected with their military mission as to be ame-
nable to military jurisdiction, it would be difficult to persuade a foreign
government that American national interests require a new grant of
extraterritoriality, so that American civil courts can sit to try these
persons abroad.1'
Short of a flat refusal to permit such courts to sit within its borders,
the foreign government might simply decline aid in obtaining evidence
or witnesses-and might thereby impede the functioning of such courts.
And who will be the attorneys to represent defendants there? That the
results in these courts would equal in fairness, much less excel, those of
.0. See also the discussion of the Toth case in the text at note 52 supra; the concurring
opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 0957)5
and the opinion of Judge Latimer in United States v. Burney, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 776, 22
C.M.R. 98 (1956). In an interesting variant of the "Brandeis brief" technique, gov-
ernment counsel submitted statements from several commanding officers overseas to the
effect that it was necessary for them to have jurisdiction over American civilians
accompanying the armed forces overseas if they were fully to perform their military
responsibilities. Counsel for the civilian dependents attacked these statements as being
ex parte, self-serving declarations. In attempting to show the practical necessities for
military jurisdiction over civilians, the Government submitted the following information
as to the large number of civilians overseas with the armed forces: Germany, 173,5x6
(among them 162,811 dependents) i Japan, 80,807; the United Kingdom, 48,138;
France, 42,038; the Philippines, 14,1 115 Ryukus (Okinawa), 13,085 ; French Morocco,
1o,4o1i Canada, Newfoundland, and Labrador, 8,492; Italy, 8,0925 Bermuda, 5,3875
Libya, 4,865i Spain, 4,766; Cuba, 3,I95; Formosa, 2,8395 Turkey, 2,715; the Azores,
2,644i Greece and Crete, 1,29i; and in other countries there are smaller civilian con-
tingents of dependents and employees accompanying the American armed forces.
1o0 See Note, 71 HARv. L. REv. 712 (1958), which contains an excellent discussion
of the alternatives.
'.o SNEE & PYE, op. cit. supra note 56, at 4-4.
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courts-martial acting pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
is highly questionable. 0 5
So far as the Court's first issue is concerned, it seems apparent that
absent military jurisdiction over civilian dependents, their punishment
will generally be forthcoming from a foreign court-if forthcoming at
all. Despite the presence of some assurances of a fair trial in such
courts, 6 this alternative has not always been viewed as highly attrac-
tive.1
07
With respect to the second issue-historical evidence concerning
military jurisdiction over civilian dependents-it should be remembered
that until recently, the United States had not stationed large armed
forces overseas and consequently the occasion for court-martialling
American dependents abroad had not arisen. Thus, at the outset, the
probability was rather great that the Court, if so inclined, could shrug
off purported historical evidence as "inconclusive"-just as was done in
the School Segregation Cases. 08
In response to the third issue, neither government counsel nor coun-
sel for the two dependents made any effort to distinguish dependents
from employees. The same necessities apply to each-the crimes of
either could have a very disruptive effect on military morale and dis-
ciplinei both are closely identified in the eyes of the foreign government
and its citizens with the American armed forces; both enjoy a large
number of special privileges by reason of their intimate contact with the
armed forces-but neither can be conveniently tried except in a court-
martial or a foreign court.1'0 Furthermore, both the dependent and the
..5 There is no point in recapitulating here what has already been said concerning the
advantages and disadvantages of an accused who is being tried by court-martial. It
may be worth noting, however, that various proposals have been made to require for
criminal trials in federal civil courts some of the safeguards familiar to military justice.
Among these are the warning against self-incrimination prior to interrogation of a sus-
pect and a strengthened right of counsel for an accused.
... EVERETT, op. cit. supra note x, at 43 ; SNEE & PYE, op. cit. slupra note 56, at
io6-i6.
0 ""Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.s. 524 (957).
' 0"Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
... Of course, there will probably be no prosecution in a foreign court unless the
foreign government has some interest of its own in prosecuting; it would probably lack
such an interest when any harm complained of had primarily been suffered by Ameri-
cans and their property. As to dependents and employees, it might well be noted that
although the employee is often situated to do more harm than a dependent to the mili-
tary mission, there are many more dependents than employees abroad with the armed
forces, and, therefore, the cumulative impact of dependents might be as great as, or
greater than, that of employees.
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employee are overseas and away from American civil courts by their own
volition.
The fourth issue seeks to adduce some distinction based on the
gravity of the offense involved-a distinction between major crimes and
petty offenses. The fifth amendment does specify that "capital, or
otherwise infamous crime" does demand a grand jury indictment-a
distinction thereby being drawn between felonies and misdemeanors.
Moreover, it has been held that the jury trial requirement of article
three of the Constitution and of the sixth amendment does not apply
to "petty offenses," whatever that term may mean."' It is not com-
pletely dear, however, that even petty offenses are exempt from the
requirement of trial by a judge holding life tenure.
Certainly, before the petition for rehearing was granted, no histori-
cal evidence had been produced and no suggestion had been made to
the effect that a distinction should be made as to military jurisdiction
over civilian dependents abroad in accord with the gravity of the offense.
Moreover, in terms of effect on the armed forces, no such distinction
between major crimes and petty offenses is completely satisfactory, since
the cumulative effect of many minor infractions may be as severe as that
arising from a few major transgressions."' In retrospect, the most sig-
nificant thing, in light of later developments, may be that the Court's
fourth issue gave no intimation whatsoever of any contemplated juris-
dictional distinction between capital and noncapital cases; nor was any
such distinction attempted thereafter by counsel on either side.
IV
AMERICAN CIVILIANS ABROAD--THE 1957 VERSION
A. The Opinion of Justice Black
In 1957, the Supreme Court, taking its second look at Reid v.
Covert, held that there was no jurisdiction to court-martial civilian
dependents for capital offenses committed overseas in peacetime. Justice
Black, writing for himself, Chief Justice Warren, Justice Douglas, and
Justice Brennan, emphasized at the outset that when acting against its
... As to "petty offenses" see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (194z) i District of
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937) ; 6z Stat. 684 (1948), i8 U.S.C. §§ (3),
3401 (1958); Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REv. 917 (i926).
"' Sometimes the petty offense can be satisfactorily disposed of administratively-
without resort to any kind of court. However, there may already be too great a tend-
ency of the armed services to resort to "administrative" action as a means of punishment.
See vEERETr, op. cit. supra note i, at 123, 135-
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citizens abroad, the United States is not free of the Bill of Rights.
According to him, the express wording of article three, section two" 2
mirrors the extraterritorial constitutional protection granted to American
citizens; and under the "obvious meaning" of that wording, this protec-
tion "is applicable to criminal trials outside of the States as a group
without regard to where the offense is committed.' 3  Justice Black does
not explain why this "obvious meaning"--like the "plain meaning" of
article one, section eight, clause fourteen of the Constitution which he
discovered in Toth v. Quarles"'4-- was not earlier perceived;"' nor why
it would have been impermissible to construe the provision in article
three, section two for jury trial of crimes "not committed within any
state" as being directed to offenses committed on the high seas or in
American territories or possessions,, or, at the very least, only to trials
which were to take place in areas where the United States was sovereign.
The Black opinion refused to concede that some of the rights pro-
vided in the Bill of Rights are less "fundamental" than others, and,
therefore, inapplicable outside the United States."' With respect to
Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, however, the Supreme Court
long ago did make such a gradation of rights and held that grand jury
indictment and trial by a common-law jury were not indispensable
there." 7 Of course, in a different constitutional context, the Supreme
Court has long been on record that certain rights, being part of a con-
cept of "ordered liberty," are more fundamental than others."" Could
it not equally as well be said that some rights are so intertwined with the
concept of a free and democratic government that they do follow the
flag everywhere, but that other rights-among them that of indictment
and trial by jury-do not apply in geographic areas where other govern-
ments hold sway and are primarily responsible for providing the politi-
cal and judicial institutions?
Justice Black disposed swiftly of In re Ross-so heavily relied on in
Kinsella v. Krueger, but now described as "one of those cases that cannot
be understoood except in its peculiar setting; even then, it seems highly
unlikely that a similar result would be reached today." As he pointed
12 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. i (1957).
"'Id. at 8.
11 Discussed at note 49 supra.
... For example, why was it overlooked when the Ross case was decided?
... Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. i, 8-9 (i957).
"" See the cases cited note 96 supra.
:18Palko v. Connecticut, 30z U.S. 319 (1937).
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out) the declaration in the Ross case that the "Constitution can have no
operation in another country" had long ago been repudiated. 19
To the Government's contention that the international agreements
entered into by the United States with Great Britain and with Japan
had created military jurisdiction, Justice Black answered "that no agree-
ment with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any
other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution."'"2 Otherwise, the Constitution could be amended by
treaties, or even by executive agreements. He distinguished and limited
Missouri v. Holland-2' by emphasizing that it involved no conflict be-
tween a treaty and a limitation stated by the Constitution. Instead,
there was at issue merely the relationship between treaty power and
the tenth amendment's reservation to the states or the people of all
power not delegated to the federal government. This viewpoint will
comfort those who have long feared that Missouri v. Holland could be
construed to permit removal by treaty of constitutional safeguards. But
Justice Black's analysis does not destroy the possibility that treaty-making
can be a means of centralization of authority through transfer to the
federal government of activities that, absent a treaty and by virtue of
the tenth amendment, would remain solely with the states.
This opinion then argued that the "natural meaning" of "land and
naval forces" in article one, section eight, clause fourteen of the Consti-
tution "does not extend to civilians--even though they may be de-
pendents living with servicemen on a military base."' 22  Justice Black
reasoned that civilian dependents either are in the "land and naval
forces" nowhere or everywhere-including the United States itself;
" Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1957). For cases that have extended constitu-
tional protection overseas, see Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) Wade v. Hunter,
336 U.S. 684 (1949) ; Balzac v. Porto Rico, z58 U.S. 298 (19z2); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304. (936).
12 Reid v. Covert, 354. U.S. i, i6 (1957).
.2. Discussed in text accompanying note 87 supra. Interestingly, Justice Black
apparently chose to ignore completely in this connection United States v. Curtiss-Wright,
299 U.S. 304. (1936).
122 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 (19S7). In n.38 to the opinion of Justice Black,
there is quoted the statement of Colonel Winthrop, the "Blackstone of Military Law,"
that the Constitution "dearly distinguishes the military from the civil class as separate
communities. It recognizes no third class which is part civil and part military ... .
WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 4.8, at 2o6. The Government took the position that
Colonel Winthrop did not live in a time when large American forces with accompanying
civilian dependents and employees were operating overseas, where no American civil




and in his view the former alternative is far preferable. So far as the
necessary and proper clause is concerned, he found no authority there
to extend congressional power beyond the class described in article one,
section eight, clause fourteen-the "land and naval forces." And this
class does not include civilian dependents!
At this point in his opinion Justice Black sounded the alarm that a
different interpretation of the necessary and proper clause would extend
military jurisdiction and "every extension of military jurisdiction is an
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the civil courts." '123 Here lurks a
misconception, for a perusal of the practical alternatives indicates rather
clearly that the real choice is between court-martial and trial in a foreign
court. Heretofore, no pressing reason has been given why American
courts should be especially solicitous to avoid the "encroachment" of our
military jurisdiction on that of foreign courts, even foreign civil courts.
Moreover, for an "encroachment" to take place, there must have
existed some civil court jurisdiction in the first place. Now consider the
case of Mrs. Covert, who is being punished for killing her husband
while in England. Under American statutory law, the only basis for
arguing that any crime has occurred is the circumstance than an article
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which prohibits murder, was
violated.' 24 The only premise for applying the Code to Mrs. Covert,
however, was the assumption that she is part of the "land and naval
forces"; and now Justice Black has said that she was not in this category,
so that there is no power "to make Rules" as to her conduct.
What, then, if Congress enacts a statute which makes it punishable
for an American wife to kill her husband in England? Whence flows the
power to enact such a law? Admittedly there are cases that allow
punishment by courts sitting in the United States of offenses committed
overseas.1 5  The hypothetical case, however, does not arise on an
American ship and does not involve some direct injury to the United
States, such as conspiring to defraud the United States or counterfeiting.
There are several dicta indicating that, even so, the United States has the
authority to punish its citizens wherever they commit an offense;' 2 and
In re Ross would appear to substantiate that position. By discrediting
In re Ross, however, and adopting a very narrow interpretation of con-
gressional power under the Constitution, Justice Black has provoked the
1'2 Reid v. Covert, 354. U.S. I, 19 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
1" Uniform Code of Military Justice art. xx8, 7oA Stat. 72 (x956), so U.S.C.
§918 (x958).
'2' See cases cited at note 36 supra.
12 fSupra note 99.
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question how an American federal court could constitutionally be given
the power to try a crime committed overseas, like Mrs. Covert's alleged
murder of her husband, unless she were part of the "land and naval
forces." And so, again, one must question the danger of "encroach-
ment" by military jurisdiction in this type of situation.
Some of these difficulties, which are posed by a narrow construction
of congressional legislative power under article one, section eight of the
Constitution suggest that Justice Black's result might have been more
palatable had it been rested solely on the limitations of article three,
section two and of the fifth and sixth amendments-limitations that
define the permissible means of exercising congressional power to punish,
rather than the scope of the underlying power. Of course, under Jus-
tice Black's interpretation of the fifth amendment, the applicability of
that amendment to civilian dependents wheresoever located is apparent.
He reasoned that "the exception in this Amendment for 'cases arising in
the land or naval forces' was undoubtedly designed to correlate with
the power granted Congress to provide for the 'Government and Regu-
lation' of the armed services.' 12 7 Civilian dependents overseas do not
fall under the "land and naval forces" within article one, section eight,
clause fourteen of the Constitution; and he concludes that undoubtedly
the exception in the fifth amendment was not designed to deprive of the
grand jury safeguard a person who is outside the court-martial jurisdic-
tion of Congress in the first place. This correlation by Justice Black
of the fifth amendment with clause fourteen is somewhat ironic, since,
as heretofore noted, use of the same technique in the Toth case would
have tended to produce a different result there.
The opinion by Justice Black commented:...
We recognize that there might be circumstances where a person could be
'in' the armed services for purposes of Clause 14 even though he had not
formally been inducted into the military or did not wear a uniform. But the
wives, children, and other dependents of servicemen cannot be placed in that
category, even though they may be accompanying a serviceman abroad at
Government expense and receiving other benefits from the Government.
It is unclear what Justice Black intended with his reference to per-
sons who were in the armed forces although not in uniform. Govern-
ment counsel took hope that by this remark Justice Black was placing
civilian employees within the scope of court-martial jurisdiction.'29 In
'
1 2
7 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 2z (-957).
'28 Id. at ,z-23.
129 The opinion contained various references to the shortcomings of courts-martial
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light of his opinion as a whole, and especially its denunciation of the
dangers of military authority, however, this hope-it could have been
readily predicted-would prove ill-founded.
The opinion insisted that the situation of civilian dependents cannot
be distinguished from that involved in Toth v. Quarles, where the
proposed exercise of military jurisdiction as to an ex-serviceman was
held unconstitutional. 30 Of course, Toth had absolutely no connection
with the armed services when action against him was commenced; but
the relationship of the civilian dependents to the military existed both at
the time of the offense and at the time of trial. Undeniably, however,
the general approach of the court's opinion in the Toth case-and espe-
cially the acute fear of military jurisdiction in general-set the stage for
Justice Black's reasoning in Reid v. Covert.
With reference to the lower court opinions upholding military juris-
diction over various civilians closely related to the armed forces, the
opinion emphasized that these cases concerned civilians "performing
services for the armed forces 'in the field' during time of war" (Justice
Black's emphasis). It added:'
To the extent that these cases can be justified, insofar as they involved trial
of persons who were not "members" of the armed forces, they must rest on
the Government's "war powers."
Seemingly, in such instances, any exception to trial by jury and other
safeguards would be based on the circumstance that for such cases, mili-
tary trial was permitted from "a time prior to the adoption of the Con-
stitution."'1 2  The analogy, of course, would be to Ex parte Quirin
which, in a wartime prosecution, denied a jury trial to eight spies, be-
cause spies had no right to jury trial under the common law or the law
of war.
83
B. The Concurring Opinions
Concurring only in the result, Justice Frankfurter delineated the
issue narrowly as concerning only civilian dependents overseas charged
with a capital crime in time of peace. According to him, "no one, how-
ever, challenges the availability to Congress of a power to provide for
trial and punishment of these dependents for such crimes.""3 4 (Of
and the possibility that Congress might regress from the comparative enlightenment of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice to a more primitive system.
: °ld at 31-32. i1d, at 33.
32 Ibid. "'Ibid.
134 Id. at 47.
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course, it is not shown dearly that either Justice Frankfurter or his
brethren have fully considered all the implications of Justice Black's
narrow interpretation of the clause fourteen power-some of which
implications have been examined earlier in this article).
Justice Frankfurter referred to the possibility that when construed
along with article one, section eight, clause fourteen of the Constitution,
the necessary and proper clause may sometimes empower Congress to
provide for court-martial of civilian dependents overseas. He drew a
distinction as to capital cases, however, and considered that where a
capital offense is charged, no such power exists.
His opinion re-examined in their historical setting the import of the
Insular Cases and of In re Ross-precedents that had been heavily relied
on by the Court in its original opinion in Kinsella v. Krueger.3 The
former decisions, Justice Frankfurter concluded, rested on the power
provided in article four, section eight of the Constitution for "Congress
to deal with 'Territory' and other Government property";' 36 and this
power would not be available to support court-martial jurisdiction in a
foreign country. The Ross case, he remarked, reflected the long-
established international practice concerning consular courts; it "is not
rooted in any abstract principal or comprehensive theory touching con-
stitutional power or its restrictions.' 3 7 What continued vitality, if any,
In re Ross might have, Justice Frankfurter found it unnecessary to
determine, in light of his view that article one, section eight, clause
fourteen of the Constitution-even when interpreted in the light of the
necessary and proper clause-does not furnish in the present cases a
sufficient basis for court-martial jurisdiction.
Justice Harlan, also concurring only in the result, stated that he
could find "no other constitutional power" than article one, section
eight, clause fourteen, to which article 2(11) of the Code can be re-
lated.' 38  He declined to discard In re Ross and the Insular Cases "as
historical anomalies," but also refused to accept them as signifying that
the "safeguards of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
automatically have no application to the trial of American citizens out-
side the United States, no matter what the circumstances."' 39 Instead,
the question is one of whicz constitutional guarantees should apply out-
side the United States.
155 Discussed in the text accompanying note 95 supra.
Id. at 53.
127 Id. at 56.






Ultimately Justice Harlan led up to his conclusion that the safe-
guards to be applied to courts-martial of civilian dependents overseas
should be determined on the basis of a balancing process, very much
like that employed in due process cases. Then he pointed out that in
at least one situation a distinction as to capital crimes had been made in
determining what constitutes constitutional "due process."'40 Where a
capital crime is involved, he was unwilling to deprive the civilian de-
pendent overseas of a jury trial.
Since the number of capital crimes committed by civilian dependents
overseas would presumably not be great, their exclusion from court-
martial jurisdiction, in accord with the views of Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan, would probably have little effect on military discipline.1
4
1
Moreover, the Uniform Code has a provision for treating as noncapital
a crime that otherwise would be capital. 142  Thus, by the simple expe-
dient of treating a case as noncapital, so that a court-martial could not
impose a death penalty, it might be possible to retain military jurisdic-
tion over crimes like premeditated murder, for which a death penalty
usually is permissible. 43
In neither of the 'cases before the Supreme Court had the civilian
dependent actually received a death sentence. Under these circumstances,
could it have been argued that when military authorities referred each
of these cases to a court-martial for trial, they had in legal effect-at
least if some sort of presumption of the legality of official action is em-
ployed--"directed that the case be treated as not capital," as authorized
by the Uniform Code, 44 and thereby transformed each trial into a non-
... Id. at 77. The distinction has been drawn in "due process" cases involving the
right of counsel in state courts. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) ; Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (.932).
" In evaluating the capital crime distinction, it may be significant that the use of
capital punishment seems to be declining today in many jurisdictions. See Time, March
25, 1960, p. i9.
142 Art. 4 9 (f), 7oA Stat. 54 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 84 9 (f) (1958).
1.. This method could not be employed where there is a mandatory death sentence
like that imposed by article io6, 7oA stat. 71 (1956), io U.S.C. § 906 (1958). As has
been already observed, however, notes 23-24 supra, that article, which pertains to spying
in time of war derives its vitality from the law of war. Even as to situations where the
death penalty was only permissible and not mandatory, it could always be argued,
"Once a death case, always a death case," although a convening authority had directed
that the case be treated as noncapital. However, such an approach would not accord
with the view that heretofore has been taken of "capital cases" for military justice
purposes.
1"" Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 4 9 (f), 7oA Stat. 54 (1956), ,o U.S.C.
§S4 9 (f) (1958).
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capital case? Admittedly this would be a far-fetched interpretation. 45
However, it is significant that there was no chance for government coun-
sel either to argue against a capital crime distinction or seek to avoid its
application in the present cases-cases where no death sentence had been
imposed; and no intimation had been given, even in the issues especially
designated for the rehearing, that capital crimes might be deemed to
fall within a special exclusion from military jurisdiction.
There can be no doubt that in terms of irreversibility, capital crimes
are sui generis,4 and special provision for capital crimes is often made
by statute.147  However, no line of demarcation is drawn expressly by
the Constitution; the fifth amendment's grand jury safeguard applied
to "a capital, or otherwise infamous crime," and not to a capital crime
alone. Nor has any historical evidence been produced that would sus-
tain such a distinction as to military jurisdiction over civilian dependents.
Indeed, it is rather hard to understand why article one, section eight,
clause fourteen of the Constitution and the necessary and proper clause
could create military jurisdiction over noncapital crimes, but at the point
of death, the necessity and propriety would suddenly terminate.
. On the other hand, Justice Harlan's suggestion that a discrimi-
nating analysis should be used in determining which constitutional safe-
guards apply to courts-martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents
seems sound. Such an analysis receives some historical sanction from
the Insular Cases and the Ross case. 48  Moreover, it provides a desir-
able flexibility, parallel to that which has been relatively successful in
the "due process" cases.'
49
Although during the Revolution, American forces did occasionally
operate outside the thirteen colonies, 50 it is unlikely that the founding
fathers envisaged a world situation that would compel a relatively per-
"'The Supreme Court has sometimes adopted unexpected interpretations of statutes
or of administrative regulations in order to avoid the possibility of conflict with the
Constitution. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (195) Peters v. Hobby, 349
U.S. 331 (955) 5 District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
""'As to the special nature of capital crimes, see the concurring opinions of Justice
Frankfurter in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 21 (1956), and Uveges v. Pennsylvania,
335 U.S. 437, 440-41 (948).
"" See, e.g., 63 Stat. 94 094A), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141, 3432 (1958) 5 FED. R. CRIM.
P. 7(a).
... Discussed in the text accompanying note 96 supra.
1"9 See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 5 (1949) Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (19i7)5 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (z937). Admittedly, this ap-
proach is lacking in certainty.




manent stationing of large American military forces overseas. Accord-
ingly, is it unfair to argue that some of the safeguards specified in the
Constitution were never intended to be mandatory for any trial con-
ducted overseas under American authority?''
Moreover, as a rule of construction, it is presumed that statutes are
intended to operate territorially. 5 Why is it extraordinary to adopt
a similar presumption as to constitutional provisions for trial by jury
and grand jury indictment? In fact, the reference in article three, sec-
tion two of the Constitution to crimes "not committed within any state"
could readily be construed to embrace only an offense committed over-
seas that it is intended to try in the United States, and not an offense
committed overseas and that it was proposed to try there. 153
The approach taken by Justice Harlan would allow some judicial
leeway in dealing with "external affairs," which, at least when the
Curtiss-Wright case was decided,'54 the Supreme Court thought required
a special application'of constitutional doctrine. (And the complexities
of "external affairs" do not appear to have diminished of late). By
holding that "fundamental" rights must be observed even in courts-
martial overseas, the Court would reserve an authority to intervene in
the event of abuses of military jurisdiction.
C. The Dissent.
Justice Clark's dissent, joined in by Justice Burton,15 emphasized
at the outset its complete satisfaction with the position taken by the
... See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 23 U.S. 347 (1909).
112 It seems interesting that in immigration cases some distinction seems to be made
between exclusion and deportation-a circumstance that indicates that territorial con-
cepts may have some influence on constitutional protections. Compare United States
v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (19o5), zith Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (192).
Similarly, under the fourth amendment, a search warrant is usually required as a basis
for the search for, and seizure of, fruits and instruments of crime. Overseas there is
no American tribunal available to issue such a warrant, however, and the privilege
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" must be construed in light of that circum-
stance. See Best v. United States, 184 F.zd 131 (st Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939
(i95i); United States v. DeLeo, 5 U.S.C.M.A. x48, 17 C.M.R. 148 (1954), and the
cases cited therein. The eighth amendment deals with "bail," but there is no American
tribunal overseas to set bail. In short, some American institutions cannot be exported
overseas; and is it not best to hold that such institutions were never intended for export,
instead of holding that because they are incapable of export, the power of the United
States to act outside its territorial boundaries should be deemed very narrow?
... It could also be argued that the words quoted from art. III § 2 may have been
directed to offenses arising on the high seas and the like, but not to crimes committed
within the boundaries of a foreign country which has its own criminal courts.
114 Discussed in the text accompanying note 93 supra.
... Justice Whitaker did not participate in the decision of the case.
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original majority in Kinsella v. Krueger. Justice Clark-after noting
that the Court was now overruling or limiting well-established prece-
dents and reversing, setting aside and overruling "two majority opinions
and judgments of this Court in these same cases... entered on June i i,
1956, less than 12 months ago"-commented:16
In substitute therefor it enters no opinion whatever for the Court. It is
unable to muster a majority. Instead, there are handed down three opinions.
But, worst of all, it gives no authoritative guidance as to what, if anything, the
Executive or the Congress may do to remedy the distressing situation in which
they now find themselves.
In a similar vein he stated, near the end of his opinion:'
My brothers who are concurring in the result seem to find some comfort
in that for the present they void an Act of Congress only as to capital cases.
I find no distinction in the Constitution between capital and other cases. In
fact, at argument all parties admitted there could be no valid differences. My
brothers are careful not to say that they would uphold the Act as to offenses
less than capital. They unfortunately leave that decision for another day.
This is disastrous to proper judicial administration as well as to law enforce-
ment. The Congress and the Executive Department are entitled to know
whether a court-martial may be constitutionally utilized to try an offense less
than capital. If so, then all that is necessary is to eliminate capital punishment
insofar as Article 2 ( 11) offenses are concerned.
Justice Clark relied heavily on dicta in Madsen v. Kinsella and Dun-
can v. Kahanamoku, and on previous lower federal court cases uphold-
ing military jurisdiction over civilians closely related to the armed
forces.158  Although such cases might be distinguished on the grounds
that they concerned military jurisdiction in time of war and were not
applicable to peacetime trials,'59 Justice Clark correctly pointed out that
.O Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. i, 78 (957).
..7 Id. at 89-9o.
... Some of these have been discussed previously in outlining the Government's posi-
tion in the litigation. See note 84 supra. Among the cases upholding military juris-
diction over civilians accompanying the armed forces overseas are these: Perlstein v.
United States, 1s1 F.2d 167 (3rd Cir. i945); Grewe v. France, 75 F. Supp. 433 (E.D.
Wis. 1948) 5 In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. Ohio 944) ; United States v. Burney,
6 U.S.C.M.A. 776, 21 C.M.R. 98 (1956) i United States v. Robertson, 5 U.S.C.M.A.
8o6, 19 C.M.R. 1o (1955); United States v. Garcia, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 88, 17 C.M.R.
88 (1954) ; United States v. Weiman, 3 U.S.C.M.A. z6, 11 C.M.R. 216 (1953).
"' The Madsen case concerned an offense committed long after hostilities had ceased
in Europe5 but jurisdiction there could still be subsumed under the law of war and the
war power. Cf. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 16o (1948).
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the war power of Congress has often been broadly construed and could
encompass the two cases before the Court.'
The dissent emphasized that for civilian dependents overseas-and,
therefore, closely related to the armed forces-courts-martial constitute
the only feasible alternative to trial in a foreign court. In this connec-
tion, it noted that in light of the positions taken by the other Justices,
"the use of a system of territorial or consular courts is now out of the
question."'' Within the Toth v. Quarles test of "the least possible
power adequate to the end proposed," Justice Clark concluded that the
absence of alternatives to article 2(11) of the Code-that is, alternatives
other than trial in a foreign court-makes it "untenable to say that




AMERICAN CIVILIANs ABROAD-THE LAST WORD
A. Permutations and Combinations
In light of the diversity of position reflected in the second edition of
Reid v. Covert, the Armed Services'6 3 and the Court of Military Ap-
peals'64 felt free to court-martial civilians overseas who were either
dependents charged with noncapital crime, or employees of the armed
services, whatever the charge. Four cases soon wended their way to
Washington as tests of this narrow interpretation. Kinsella v. Single-
ton '5 concerned the prosecution of a civilian dependent for a noncapital
offense-involuntary manslaughter of her young child. 6  Grisham
V. Hagan6 7 involved a civilian employee of the Army who was tried
in France for the capital offense of premeditated murder and con-
'"Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. x, 8z (1957). The cases he cited are Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) and Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469
(1947). The former states, at 3275 "We may take judicial notice of the international
situation at the time the Act of 1916 was passed." It adds that building the Wilson
Dam was "adopted to the purposes of national defense." The latter case announces, at
476, that "... we think reasonable preparation for the storm of war is a proper exercise
of the war power." See also cases cited at note 23 supra.
1 ""Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 87 (957).
162Id. at 89.
"'Note, 71 HARV. L. REv. 712, 713 (1958).
'6 United States v. Dial, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 541, 26 C.M.R. 321 (1958) , United States
v. Wilson, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 60, 25 C.M.R. 322 (1958).
265 361 U.S. 234 (5960) (arising in Germany).
16 The defendant's husband, a soldier, was convicted by court-martial for the same
offense and sentenced to confinement.
167 361 U.S. 278 (196o).
[Vol. i96o: 366
MILITARY JURISDICTION
victed of unpremeditated murder, a noncapital offense. in McElroy
v. Guagliardo68 and Wilson v. Bohlender'69 a civilian employee had
been court-martialled for a noncapital offense.
B. The Opinion of the Court
In each case, the Supreme Court rejected military jurisdiction5 and,
somewhat amazingly, the opinion of the Court was delivered in each
instance by Justice Clark, who had been the apostle of courts-martial in
the Reid v. Covert litigation. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Doug-
las, Black, and Brennan joined him. In the Singleton case, involving
the civilian dependent, Justice Clark noted at the outset that the "ques-
tion is not one of first impression."'" Then, he referred to the 1956
opinion in Kinsella v. Krueger, where "we decided by a bare majority
that the the article was a valid exercise of the power of the Congress
under Art. 4, § 3, to 'make all needful Rules and Regulations' for the
'Territories' of the United States."''i Of course, there is some presump-
tion of the correctness of Justice Clark's explanation of that earlier
opinion, which he wrote; however, his explanation will prove disquieting
to one who read that opinion. It seems to say that a majority of the
Court in 1956 had concluded that Great Britain and Japan, locations
of the two homicides there involved, were American "territories"-
startling news, to say the least.
The Court's opinion next noted that ultimately a majority of the
justices concluded in Reid v. Covert that, in capital cases, trial by court-
martial of civilian dependents overseas "could not constitutionally be
justified."' 72 Since Justice Clark and his four brethren could find no
evidence of any constitutional distinction between capital and noncapital
offenses with respect to congressional power under article one, section
eight, clause fourteen of the Constitution, and since the distinction seems
to have originated with Justices Frankfurter and Harlan-without the
aid of counsel' 73---the majority concluded that noncapital offenses com-
168 361 U.S. 2S (596o). Two airmen, tried as co-conspirators, were convicted by
court-martial for the offenses, which had allegedly been committed in Morocco.
211 Ibid. Bohlender's offense had been committed in Berlin5 and possibly, because of
Berlin's special status, military jurisdiction could have been justified under the law of
war. The Court declined, however, to consider this possibility, because it had been sug-
gested by the Government as an afterthought and the case had not been tried on that
theory.
170 361 U.S. at 236.
171 Id. at 237.
17 2
Id. at 238.
17' Neither side had argued for such a distinction in the Reid v. Covert litigation.
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mitted by civilian dependents overseas should also be exempt from
military jurisdiction.
The rejection of the proposed distinction is completely logicali but
the following palpable bit of illogic was adduced by Justice Clark to
support his contention: 174
Another serious obstacle to permitting prosecution of noncapital offenses,
while rejecting capital ones, is that it would place in the hands of the military
an unreviewable discretion to exercise jurisdiction over civilian dependents
simply by downgrading the offense, thus stripping the accused of his consti-
tutional rights and protections. By allowing this assumption of the "garb of
mercy", we would be depriving a capital offender of his constitutional means
of defense and in effect would nullify the second Covert case....
It is a novel concept of evasion to claim that the Government evades
safeguards accorded in death cases by not trying a person on a possible
capital charge. The purpose of those safeguards has been served, and,
therefore, the reason for them has vanished. Is it an evasion of the
grand jury safeguard when a prosecutor charges a defendant with a
misdemeanor instead of a possible felony?
171
Justice Clark's participation in the rejection of a distinction for capi-
tal crimes raises an interesting question about the proper scope of the
doctrine of stare decisis. In the final disposition of Reid v. Covert-as
Justice Clark himself noted there forcefully in his dissent' 7 -- there was
no majority against military jurisdiction except in capital cases. Was
Justice Clark free, therefore, to argue that he still thought that the
result was erroneous in Reid v. Covert, that he did not see any logical
distinction between capital and noncapital offenses, but that, to confine
the previous error to as narrow a scope as possible, he would adopt that
distinction? 1 77 And to what extent were Justices Whitaker and Stewart,
who had not participated in Reid v. Covert, free to reexamine the extent
170 Id. at 244-45.
' Later in his opinion Justice Clark argued that application of a capital-noncapital
distinction "would free from military prosecution a civilian accompanying or employed
by the armed services who committed a capital offense, while the same civilian could be
prosecuted by the military for a noncapital crime." Id. at 248. At this point, the
Court was clearly assuming that the offense could not be downgraded from capital to
noncapital and that "once a capital case, always a capital case." This is an obvious
contradiction of the premise for the argument quoted in the text accompanying note 174
supra.
170 Quoted in the text at note x56 supra.
177 Ibid. The passages quoted from his dissent certainly tend to create the impression
that he then felt perfectly free in the future to uphold military jurisdiction except for
capital crimes.
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of congressional power to establish military jurisdiction over civilians?
In answering those questions, it should be recalled that only four jus-
tices ruled in Reid v. Covert that civilian dependents overseas in time
of peace were placed by the Constitution completely beyond the author-
ity of courts-martial. In so far as the importance of precedents is con-
cerned, it might also be worthwhile to remember the remarks by Justice
Clark in his Reid v. Covert dissent concerning the overthrow of prece-
dents, even in the same case.1
7 8
The majority looked to the "landmark" case of Toth v. Quarles for
its premise that considerations of discipline cannot provide an excuse
for "new expansion of court-martial jurisdiction at the expense of normal
and constitutionally preferable systems of trial by jury."179  It has here-
tofore been emphasized ad nauseam that the encroachment here com-
plained of will exist only if American civil courts do have jurisdiction;
and strong doubt has been expressed whether the American civil courts
do, for any practical purpose, have a jurisdiction to punish the acts of
civilian dependents abroad. The choice is between courts-martial and
foreign courts-not courts-martial and American civil courts.
In dealing with civilian employees, Justice Clark announced for the
majority that there is no military jurisdiction-whether for capital or
noncapital offenses. In so far as the historical evidence is concerned,
the conclusion was this:' s°
Although it is true that there are materials supporting prosecution of sutlers
and other civilians by courts-martial, these materials are "too episodic, too
meager, to form a solid basis in history, preceding and contemporaneous with
the framing of the Constitution, for constitutional adjudication."
The language quoted here by the majority is that used by Justice Frank-
furter's concurrence in Reid v. Covert'. to describe the historical evi-
dence adduced there by the Government to show military jurisdiction
over civilians in general and civilian dependents in particular.
The majority's opinion is weakest when it seeks to suggest some
alternatives. One solution envisaged, and purportedly derived from
the case of Ex parte Reed," 2 decided in 1879, would involve the signing
by civilian employees of agreements to submit to military jurisdiction.
178 Ibid.
'"0 Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 36. U.s. 234, 239-40 (196o). (Em-
phasis added.)
180 McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 28r, 284 (296o).
181 354 U.S. at 64..
82 100 U.S. 3 (879).
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Whether this expedient could also be used to provide jurisdiction
over civilian dependents is not indicated by the Court, but there seems
to be no logical reason for distinction.
The difficulty involved here would seem to stem from the concept
that although an accused can waive trial by jury with the consent of the
prosecution and of the court,'8 3 he cannot, merely by his consent, create
jurisdiction in a court.'8 4  If Congress does not have authority to em-
power a court-martial to hear the case of a civilian employee or de-
pendent in peacetime, it would seem highly questionable that any agree-
ment to submit to military jurisdiction at all times in the future would
suffice for this purpose.8 5 Furthermore, under the majority view of
the congressional power "to make rules" for "the land and naval forces"
and the narrow interpretation of those "forces," there is a question
about the right of Congress to denominate as criminal the conduct of
civilian employees and dependents overseas., To give weight to any
such agreement would resemble allowing a federal district court to try
a man for a violation of state law merely because he consented to the
trial.
If a civilian employee can subject himself to military jurisdiction by
his voluntary act in signing a paper to that effect, a tremendous emphasis
is being put on the manner in which volition is exercised. What does
the paper add to the volition already manifested by going with the
armed forces overseas as an employee or dependent in the first place-
especially when a statute is on the books proclaiming that military juris-
diction will attach overseas.1
87
183Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). It should be noted, however, that
there the waiver was made in court and subject to all the safeguards of the courtroom,
and did not include offenses that might be committed in the future.
"" At least, jurisdiction over the cause of action or subject matter cannot be acquired
by consent. See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 85 (1940) ; 35 id. Federal Courts § 83(a) (x943);
14 AM. JUR. Courts § 184 (1938). In light of the Court's analysis in terms of consti-
tutional power under art. I, § 8, cl. 14, these authorities seem applicable. But see, United
States v. Garcia, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 88, 17 C.M.R. 88 (955).
1'" What if the employee or dependent denied full comprehension of the agreement's
effect? What about accusations of coercion to sign away valuable constitutional rights?
188 At least, where there is no rather direct interference with governmental functions,
like that involved in United States v. Bowman, 26o U.S. 94. (1922).
"8 It is probably old-fashioned to argue that one should be presumed to know the
law-even when it has been well-publicized, as was done with the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. However, there is probably little likelihood that civilians going over-
seas would have greater understanding of the significance of signing an agreement to be
subject to military jurisdiction.
MILIT.RY JURISDICTION
The second alternative proposed by the Court to meet any military
needs for control over civilian employees relied on the power to put a
man in uniform. "If a doctor or dentist may be 'drafted' into the armed
services... there should be no legal objection to the organization and
recruitment of other civilian specialists needed by the armed services."' 88
Thus, the culmination of a series of cases which express a desire to pro-
tect American citizens from the alleged abuses of courts-martial is the
suggestion that more American citizens be drafted into the armed
services, where they will be subject not only to courts-martial, but also
to all other liabilities and responsibilities of a serviceman. Here is a
proposed alternative probably even less attractive than surrender of
Americans to foreign tribunals for trial-a surrender that many thought
would be the necessary concomitant of Reid v. Covert.
C. The Opinion of Justices Harlan and Frankfurter
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Frankfurter, agreed with the
majority that civilian employees cannot be tried by court-martial for
capital crimes. For noncapital crimes, however, these two jurists con-
dude that military jurisdiction does exist as to both civilian dependents
and employees. With respect to the result in Reid v. Covert, the
opinion remarked that no single view "commanded the assent of a
majority of the Court"; then it added that only on a "faulty view" of
the Covert case does it control as to noncapital crimes.
189
These two Justices considered that article one, section eight, clause
fourteen of the Constitution must be interpreted in the light of the
Necessary and Proper Clause and that it is not the military "status" of
an accused that controls his amenability to military jurisdiction, but
instead "the closeness or remoteness of the relationship between the
person affected and the military establishment."' "  In light of the
close relationship to the armed forces of civilian employees and de-
pendents overseas, they fall within military jurisdiction5 and, under the
view taken in the majority opinion, the United States will be hampered,
Justice Harlan claimed, in dealing with complicated international prob-
lems that have required American forces to be stationed overseas in the
first place.
See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (196o). The
Court relied here on Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) (the doctor draft).
... Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (196o).
2001d .at 257.
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D. The Opinion of Justices Whitaker and Stewart
Justice Whitaker filed an opinion for himself and Justice Stewart,
these being the two who had not participated in deciding any of the
earlier cases on military jurisdiction. Justice Whitaker stated that the
source of any power to court-martial civilians overseas lies in article one,
section eight, 'clause fourteen of the Constitution, and, in his view, this
power extends only to the "land and naval forces,"-however that
phrase may be defined. The necessary and proper clause does not give
authority under clause fourteen to "make Rules" for persons not in the
"land and naval forces," no matter how close those persons may be to
the armed services, either functionally or otherwise. In a footnote,
Justice Whitaker acknowledged that, on this particular point, Justice
Stewart disagreed with him and should be counted in the Harlan
camp.
191
Concerning congressional power to enact article 2(11) of the Code,
the opinion remarked:' "Certain aspects of that broad question have
recently been determined in Reid v. Covert ... ., and though not a
Court opinion, I consider that decision to be binding on me." The
logical question here is: As to what is the decision "binding"? Is it only
"binding" to the effect that civilian dependents cannot be court-mar-
tialled overseas for capital offenses? Or that civilian dependents can-
not be court-martialled overseas? Justice Whitaker chose the latter
alternative because, as to constitutional power, he could find no basis for
a capital-versus-noncapital distinction. Just as with respect to Justice
Clark's opinion, the question can be raised whether stare decisis really
demands that a small constitutional error be expanded into a large error
merely because it is impossible to draw a logical line between the two.
Or, to put it differently, it would not seem a defiance of stare decisis for
five justices-Clark, Whitaker, Stewart, Frankfurter, and Harlan-to
have disposed of the cases by holding that as to all noncapital offenses,
military jurisdiction did exist for both dependents and employees, even
though no majority for military jurisdiction existed as to capital
offenses.
Justices Whitaker and Stewart concluded that for civilian employees,
the situation is quite different and that these are subject to court-martial
for either capital or noncapital crimes. History and necessity, they
believed, support the conclusion that the "land and naval forces" include
"civilians employed by the armed forces at bases in foreign lands to do
2"'Id. at 261 n.z.
102 Id. at z62. (Emphasis added.)
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essential work for the military establishment."' 93  With respect to the
argument that, so far as the historical evidence shows, civilian employees
could only be court-martialled when serving with the armed forces "in
the field," this opinion reasoned that "in the field" does not mean only
in time of war. Indeed, the concept is such "that armed forces of the
United States stationed at bases in foreign lands-where jurisdiction of
our civil courts does not extend-must, under turbulent world condi-
tions," be regarded as "in the field."' 94  The practical necessities and
lack of alternatives buttress the conclusion that military jurisdiction ex-
tends to civilian employees overseas.
VI
EVALUATION
A. The Judicial Process
The complex history of the recent cases on military jurisdiction over
civilians reflects the operation of the judicial process almost at its worst.
If Reid v. Covert had concerned a noncapital case, the outcome would
probably have been different. Furthermore, if the first case in the series
to reach the Supreme Court had been one involving a civilian employee
charged with a noncapital case, it seems even more probable that there
military jurisdiction would have been upheld. If, then, the next case had
concerned a civilian employee charged with a capital offense, would a
majority have rejected any capital-noncapital distinction as illogical and
held that military jurisdiction extended to all categories of offenses?
And would civilian dependents later have been swept under the
umbrella?
Many such questions can be conjured up. And they serve to suggest
quite strongly that "the contingencies of judicial review and of litiga-
tion" have here played a major part in determining the scope of military
jurisdiction."" Some would reply that this is an inevitable concomitant
1 03 Id. at 271.
Id. at 276. Perhaps the rationale of the cases upholding jurisdiction over civilians
with the armed forces "in the field" in time of war is that, under such circumstances, it
is difficult and disruptive of military operations to have trials in the regular civil courts.
Even Ex parle Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), recognized that unavailability
of the civil courts was a factor to be considered in ruling on military jurisdiction under
martial law. For American armed forces overseas, the American civil courts are often
as unavailable in practice as they would be for forces operating in the field. Under these
circumstances, should not the same necessity uphold military jurisdiction as has upheld
it for the cases arising "in the field"?
"' Cf. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 145 (940).
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of stare decisis. It would be incongruous, however, to argue that stare
decisis really had much relevance to the litigation on military jurisdic-
tion-litigation wherein the Supreme Court granted a rehearing, com-
pletely reversed itself, and threw into discard a number of long-estab-
lished precedents.
Since the special exception created by Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan for capital crimes played a major role in the drama, it is also
worth noting that the distinction between capital and noncapital offenses
was virtually conjured out of thin air by these two jurists. It was not
suggested by the parties in their briefs in Reid v. Covert; nor did the
issues specified in connection with the rehearing there give any intima-
tion that such a distinction was being considered. Ironically, too, no
death sentence was before the Court; and, if the point had been raised,
government counsel might even have argued that under the provisions
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the cases of the capital de-
pendents had been treated as noncapital. 1°' To heighten the irony, it
should also be noted that the likelihood that a civilian dependent over-
seas would be sentenced to death by a court-martial is almost negligible.
Yet, the risk of capital punishment for a dependent seems to have been
the tail that wagged the dog of military jurisdiction.
B. Future Constitutional Attacks on the Uniform Code
Near the beginning of this article, reference was made not only to
article 2(11) and 3(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but
also to other articles that pertain to military jurisdiction over civilians. 197
How many of these provisions can survive constitutional attacks based
on the decisions which have been discussed here? As to discharged
servicemen held as military prisoners, a well-entrenched precedent exists
for allowing court-martial, 9 ' and it is doubtful that a majority could
be mustered to overturn this decision. If so, the problem might be
handled administratively in some instances by delaying the issuance of
a discharge to a prisoner and retaining him in the armed services until
he has completed his military confinement. 99
... See discussion in text accompanying note 144 supra.
"" See text accompanying note x5 supra.
"'Kahn v. Anderson, z55 U.S. x (1920).
... Delaying the issuance of the discharge might give rise to some administrative
problems. Cf. United States v. Washington, 6 U.S.C.M.A. X4, 19 C.M.R. 240 (1955).
Since time in confinement is considered "bad time," which must be made good by the
serviceman, 72 Stat. 1442 (1958), 1o U.S.C. § 972 (.958), there would seem to be no
problem about expiration of an enlistment while the serviceman was in confinement.
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With respect to article 2(io) of the Code, which extends military
jurisdiction to civilians with the armed forces "in the field" in time of
war, no clear majority of the justices is on record in favor of constitu-
tionality. There is some indication that approval will be given of such
jurisdiction, however, although subject probably to a rather limited
conception of "in the field." Since any case under this article would,
by definition, arise during a war, when, of course, the courts have more
of a tendency to uphold military authority, this provision will probably
withstand constitutional attack.
Military jurisdiction over all persons on leased areas outside the
United States may still be sustainable under the congressional power
conferred by article four, section three of the Constitution to "make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States." The dismissed officer's right
to trial by general court-martial, as provided by article four of the Code
is inconsistent with the basic approach that finally has prevailed in the
military jurisdiction litigation-4.e., that one must be in the "land and
naval forces" to be subject to court-martial. In McElroy v. Gieagliardo,
however, the majority-as heretofore noted2°---did present an alterna-
tive that involved creating jurisdiction by consenti and this principle
would seem to allow a court-martial for the dismissed officer, since under
article four, he, and not the Government, is seeking trial by court-
martial.
The provisions in the Uniform Code for court-martial of spies and
those who aid the enemy seem perfectly sustainable under the law of
war as applied in Ex parte Quirin.201 The provision for military juris-
diction over certain contempts can likewise be upheld, on the ground
that contempts were beyond the right to trial by jury at common law.
C. Need for New Legislation
"A half loaf," it has been suggested, "is better than no loaf at all."
Accordingly, even one who dislikes the position as to military jurisdiction
taken by the Supreme Court must determine whether, by new legisla-
tion, Congress can salvage something from the shambles. For the Toth
situation, it would appear desirable that Congress enact a provision plac-
ing in federal district courts a jurisdiction to punish serious violations of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice as to which no charges had been
oo See text accompanying note z8 z supra.
201 31 7 U.S. 1 (194z).
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filed before the accused was discharged from the armed services and
reverted to civilian status.
With respect to civilians overseas, it might also be wise to provide
jurisdiction in the federal district court over acts that, if committed by
a serviceman, would constitute violations of the Uniform Code. In
most instances, any such trial might be impractical; but there would
probably be some cases where all the evidence and witnesses might
readily be available for a trial in the United States. A question has
been raised earlier in this article about the constitutional basis for enact-
ing substantive criminal legislation to govern the actions of civilian
dependents and employees overseas with the armed forces. If they
are not in the "land and naval forces," where is the power to "make
Rules" for them? On the other hand, there is some precedent for the
view that the United States has power to punish the crimes of its citizens,
wheresoever committed." 2 Under the circumstances, there would be
nothing to lose by enacting such a statute, and even a fair hope that such
legislation would be upheld as constitutional.
D. International Affairs
Prior to Reid v. Covert, several precedents seemed to provide res-
ervoirs of congressional power for dealing with international affairs.
For instance, Missouri v. Holland 3 took a very broad view of the
treaty-making power; and the Curtiss-Wright case204 affirmed that as to
external affairs, the federal government held very wide powers, not
-all necessarily specified in the Constitution, and which were attributes of
the sovereignty inherited from the British Crown. The Ross case205
indicated that there was even a power to establish courts abroad.
In Reid v. Covert, a narrow interpretation of the treaty power was
taken, and the theory advanced in the Curtiss-Wright case was almost
ignored. I re Ross was treated as an historical anomaly. And even as
to matters with grave international overtones, the Supreme Court has
required that Congress find express constitutional authorization for its
action, rather than rely on general "sovereignty" or on treaty provisions.
The significance of such rulings for the conduct of American foreign
affairs should be obvious. Indeed, the Court's very restrictive concept
of congressional and executive power could do great harm to this coun-
try's ability to cope with today's crucial international problems. And
22 See cases cited note 99 supra.
200 z52 U.S. 416 (1920).
o'299 U.S. 304 (936).
205 140 U.S. 453 (189).
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such a concept hardly accords with the oft-heard comment that the
American Constitution is a "growing" document.
Expediency is no basis for any interpretation that would, in effect,
amend the Constitution. On the other hand, practical considerations
should not be totally sacrificed to abstract theory. The decisions as to
military jurisdiction over certain civilians are a perfect example of such
sacrifice to theory, since the dangers of abuse by the military were not
so great as pictured by the Court; the need for military authority was,
and is, very pressing; and in many instances, the position of an accused
will be harmed, rather than helped, by the absence of court-martial
jurisdiction.
E. The Constitution Follows the Flag
The Supreme Court was definitely correct in repudiating the dictum
of the Ross case that the Constitution has no operation outside the United
States. It does have, as the cases have long since established. There is
still room, however, for a discriminating analysis that would draw a
line between those fundamental rights that are exported and those that
are not. The refusal to draw any such line commits the United States
still further to rigidity in coping with international problems.
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